SMU Law Review
Volume 75

Issue 1

Article 11

2022

Solving the Procedural Puzzles of the Texas Heartbeat Act and Its
Imitators: The Potential for Defensive Litigation
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes
South Texas College of Law
Author(s) ORCID Identifier:
Howard M. Wasserman:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6306-8641
Howard M. Wasserman
FIU Law
Author(s) ORCID Identifier:
Howard M. Wasserman:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6306-8641

Recommended Citation
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Howard M Wasserman, Solving the Procedural Puzzles of the Texas
Heartbeat Act and Its Imitators: The Potential for Defensive Litigation, 75 SMU L. REV. 187 (2022)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol75/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

SOLVING THE PROCEDURAL PUZZLES OF
THE TEXAS HEARTBEAT ACT AND ITS
IMITATORS: THE POTENTIAL FOR
DEFENSIVE LITIGATION
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes* & Howard M. Wasserman**

ABSTRACT
The Texas Heartbeat Act (SB8) prohibits abortions following detection
of a fetal heartbeat, a constitutionally invalid ban under current Supreme
Court precedent. But the law adopts a unique enforcement scheme—it prohibits enforcement by government officials in favor of private civil actions
brought by “any person,” regardless of injury. Texas sought to burden reproductive-health providers and rights advocates with costly litigation and
potentially crippling liability.
In a series of articles, we explore how SB8’s exclusive reliance on private
enforcement creates procedural and jurisdictional hurdles to challenging
the law’s constitutional validity and obtaining judicial review. This piece
explores defensive litigation, in which a rights holder violates the law, gets
sued (usually in state court), and raises the law’s constitutional invalidity as
a defense, asking the court to dismiss the enforcement action. The article
compares numerous similar situations in which constitutional rights must
be litigated defensively. It then examines the processes through which SB8
challenges can be litigated defensively; these include how providers might
trigger a lawsuit, the role of “friendly” plaintiffs in bringing suit, limitations
on state standing, and avenues to reach the Supreme Court of the United
States for final review.
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I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE Texas Heartbeat Act,1 enacted in 2021 as Texas Senate Bill 8
(SB8), prohibits abortions after detection of a fetal-heartbeat.2
This effectively prohibits abortions after five to six weeks of pregnancy (often before a person is aware of the pregnancy), a category comprising as much as 90% of prior abortions in the state.3 The law is clearly
constitutionally invalid under the Supreme Court’s prevailing reproductive-freedom jurisprudence, under which states cannot prohibit abortions
prior to fetal viability,4 at twenty-three to twenty-six weeks.5 Unless the
Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade6 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey7 or modifies the scope of reproductive freedom—as the Court was asked in October Term 20218—this is not
1. See Texas Heartbeat Act, 87th Leg., R.S., S.B. 8 (Tex. 2021) (codified at TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–171.212).
2. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.203.
3. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action ¶¶ 61–62, 91,
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 1:21-CV-616-RP, 2021 WL 3821062 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 25, 2021), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 142 S. Ct. 522; see also Christina Caron, What
Does It Really Mean to Be 6 Weeks Pregnant?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/parenting/abortion-six-weeks-pregnant.html [https://
perma.cc/7C3K-S4PE].
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
5. See Matthew A. Rysavy et al., Between-Hospital Variation in Treatment and Outcomes in Extremely Preterm Infants, 372 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1801, 1804–07 (2015).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (mem.) (2021) (No. 19-1392); Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–11,
Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (No. 19-1392) [hereinafter Dobbs Transcript of Oral Argument],
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a close constitutional question as a matter of judicial precedent.
But courts cannot answer that not-close substantive question without
solving a series of procedural puzzles. SB8 prohibits public enforcement
of the new ban—no state government or officer can bring an enforcement
proceeding.9 The law creates a private cause of action empowering “any
person,” regardless of injury, stake, or personal connection to any abortion, to sue a provider or other person who performs or aids or abets any
post-heartbeat abortion. “Any person” can recover statutory damages of
not less than $10,000 per prohibited abortion, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.10 The law imposes crippling financial consequences on reproductive-health providers and reproductive-freedom advocates who assist
pregnant people in obtaining abortion services by providing information,
funding, and other support. The actual or threatened financial burden—
through money judgments and the cost of defending a wave of litigation—prompts them to stop providing and supporting abortion services
on the risk of financial liability and bankruptcy, making it difficult for
patients to obtain abortion services and information in the state.11
Courts adjudicate constitutional questions, and decide on a law’s constitutional validity, in two postures: offensive (which we might label preenforcement, preemptive, or anticipatory) or defensive (which we might
label enforcement or coercive). Challenges to most abortion regulations
follow an offensive path. Reproductive-health providers (doctors, nurses,
clinics), patients, reproductive-rights advocacy organizations, or reproductive-freedom supporters12 sue in federal district court as soon as, if
not before, an abortion restriction takes effect; the defendant is the state
executive officer responsible for enforcing the law (such as the attorney
general or the head of the state’s department of health and human services); and the suit seeks a declaratory judgment that the law is constitutionally invalid and an injunction prohibiting the defendant officer from
enforcing the law against the plaintiff.13
SB8 upended that strategy. In July 2021—after the law’s enactment but
before its effective date—a collection of reproductive-health providers,
doctors, and reproductive-rights advocates led by Texas-founded Whole
Woman’s Health pursued the ordinary litigation strategy, suing numerous
government officials and others in federal court. Following a series of
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/191392_4425.pdf [https://perma.cc/U998-3LNP].
9. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.207(a).
10. See id. § 171.208(a)–(b).
11. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 545, 547–48 (2021)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); MARY ZIEGLER,
ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT 207 (2020).
12. For simplicity, we use “providers” to cover reproductive-health providers, patients,
rights holders, and reproductive-freedom advocates and supporters who might be subject
to SB8 suits and who might seek to challenge the constitutional validity of the heartbeat
ban.
13. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112–13, 2117 (2020); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300–01 (2016).
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procedural rulings through multiple levels of the federal judiciary, a grant
of certiorari before judgment, and expedited briefing and argument, a
divided Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson allowed
limited offensive claims against one set of government officials while rejecting others.14
Critics argue that SB8 prevents federal courts from performing their
essential function of stopping “Texas’s brazen defiance of the rule of law
and the federal constitutional rights to which Texans are entitled.”15 SB8
stymies “traditional mechanisms of federal judicial review,”16 evades “effective judicial protection of rights in federal and state court,”17 and strips
“citizens of the ability to invoke the power of the federal courts to vindicate their rights.”18 The law represents a “deliberate attempt to thwart
ordinary mechanisms of federal judicial review,”19 while “transform[ing]
the state courts from a forum for the protection of rights into a mechanism for nullifying them.”20
The Whole Woman’s Health dissenters furthered these themes. Chief
Justice Roberts complained that “Texas has employed an array of stratagems designed to shield its unconstitutional law from judicial review,”21
with its purpose and effect to “nullify this Court’s rulings.”22 Justice
Sotomayor argued that SB8 “is structured to thwart review and result in
‘a denial of a hearing.’”23 And she criticized the majority for “reward[ing]
the State’s efforts at nullification,”24 thereby “betray[ing] not only the
citizens of Texas, but also our constitutional system of government.”25
It overstates the matter to claim SB8 insulates itself from constitutional
challenge. The heightened rhetoric surrounding the law illustrates how
providers, advocates, and reproductive-rights supporters—and the Supreme Court dissenters—have been “hypnotized” by the law’s procedural
challenges,26 conflating the law’s obvious substantive defects with valid, if
complex, procedural rules. In the first article in this series, we explain
14. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 531, 538–39; infra notes 65–68 and
accompanying text.
15. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action, supra note 3, ¶¶
18–19.
16. Complaint ¶ 4, United States v. Texas, No. 1:21-CV-796-RP, 2021 WL 4593319
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 142 S. Ct. 522.
17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct.
522 (2021) (No. 21-463), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/21-463_8758.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ4M-2CVJ].
18. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 15.
19. Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 24–25, United States v. Texas, 2021 WL
4593319 (No. 1:21-CV-796-RP).
20. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4.
21. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 543 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 545.
23. Id. at 548 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
24. Id. at 551.
25. Id. at 546.
26. Anthony J. Colangelo, Suing Texas Senate Bill 8 Plaintiffs Under Federal Law for
Violations of Constitutional Rights, 74 SMU L. REV. F. 136, 137 (2021).
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why the Whole Woman’s Health majority was correct in rejecting most
(but not all) offensive challenges to SB8, while suggesting other targets
and strategies for offensive litigation having potential but requiring some
patience.27 SB8 limits, but does not prevent, providers from obtaining offensive pre-enforcement relief in federal court. But “those seeking to
challenge the constitutionality of state laws are not always able to pick
and choose the timing and preferred forum for their arguments.”28
The solution is defensive litigation, a common, often required, available, and sufficient posture for vindicating some constitutional rights.29 A
provider performs or enables a statutorily prohibited abortion; “any person” sues that provider in state court; and the provider defends that SB8’s
prohibition on post-heartbeat abortions is constitutionally invalid and an
invalid law cannot provide the basis for civil liability, requiring the court
to dismiss the action.
That process continues as to SB8 as of this writing. Dr. Alan Braid, a
Texas physician, published an op-ed in the Washington Post announcing
that he had performed one first-trimester, post-heartbeat abortion.30
Three lawsuits followed,31 setting the necessary test cases and the opportunity to present SB8’s constitutional invalidity as a defense to liability.
This analysis of defensive litigation extends beyond Texas and SB8.
Other states have introduced, considered, or threatened copycat laws on
abortion32 and firearm possession,33 and the structure can extend to a
host of substantive rights, as Justice Kavanaugh worried during oral
27. See generally Howard M. Wasserman & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Solving the
Procedural Puzzles of Texas Heartbeat Act and Its Imitators: The Limits and Opportunities
for Offensive Litigation, 71 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (2022).
28. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 537.
29. See Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1049–50, 1102. But see Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
30. Alan Braid, Opinion, Why I Violated Texas’s Extreme Abortion Ban, WASH. POST,
(Sept. 18, 2021, 4:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/18/texasabortion-provider-alan-braid [https://perma.cc/YTV4-596G]; see also Michael Levenson,
Texas Doctor Says He Performed an Abortion in Defiance of New State Law, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/us/texas-abortion-alan-braid.html
[https://perma.cc/SV6Y-X6GA].
31. See generally Original Petition and Request for Admissions ¶¶ 17, 19, Tex. Heartbeat Project v. Braid, No. 21-2276-C (241st Dist. Ct., Smith County, Tex. filed Sept. 22,
2021) [hereinafter Tex. Heartbeat Project Complaint]; Complaint ¶¶ 13–15, Stilley v.
Braid, No. 2021CI19940 (438th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. filed Sept. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Stilley Complaint]; Complaint ¶ 1, Gomez v. Braid, No. 2021CI19920 (224th Dist. Ct.
Bexar County, Tex., filed Sept. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Gomez Complaint].
32. Florida Heartbeat Act, H.B. 167, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.); Eric Lutz, Florida Is
Already Cooking Up a Texas-Style Abortion Ban, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 3, 2021), https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/2021/09/florida-already-cooking-up-texas-style-abortion-ban
[https://perma.cc/HE3K-T2VF].
33. California’s Governor Pledges to Model an Assault Weapons Ban on Texas Abortion Law, NPR (Dec. 12, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/12/12/1063489922/california-governor-gavin-newsom-assault-weapons-ban-texas-abortion-law [https://perma.cc/G3R3B2H3].
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argument.34
Today it is abortion providers and those who assist them; tomorrow
it might be gun buyers who face liability for every purchase.
Churches could be hauled into far-flung courts to defend their religious practices because someone somewhere disagrees with them.
Same-sex couples could be sued by neighbors for obtaining a marriage license. And Black families could face lawsuits for enrolling
their children in public schools.35
As Justice Sotomayor closed her Whole Woman’s Health dissent:
New permutations of S. B. 8 are coming. In the months since this
Court failed to enjoin the law, legislators in several States have discussed or introduced legislation that replicates its scheme to target
locally disfavored rights. What are federal courts to do if, for example, a State effectively prohibits worship by a disfavored religious
minority through crushing “private” litigation burdens amplified by
skewed court procedures, but does a better job than Texas of disclaiming all enforcement by state officials? Perhaps nothing at all,
says this Court.36
Justice Sotomayor’s dire warnings about “this madness”37 aside,
neither SB8 nor its imitators succeed in avoiding judicial review or determinations of their constitutional invalidity. To be sure, SB8 is extreme. Its
substantive rule blatantly contradicts prevailing judicial precedent; the
universe of potential plaintiffs is unbounded; the procedural rules are unfavorable; and potential liability is steep. The chilling effect of having to
violate the law and await enforcement to pursue either path imposes a
genuine burden on providers, advocates, and their pregnant patients.
But the difference is of degree, not kind. SB8’s extremity affects its
constitutional validity; it should not affect the process through which that
validity is litigated and adjudicated. A proper understanding of defensive
litigation as a mechanism for judicial review, including its historical and
successful use in other areas, demonstrates the point. This article shows
how defensive litigation can and should proceed, successfully, in challenging SB8 and its imitators and in stopping their enforcement.
II. A HISTORY

OF THE

TEXAS HEARTBEAT ACT

SB8 does not represent the first attempt to utilize private civil litigation
to stop or limit abortion. Some states allow a patient to sue a provider for
damages resulting from her abortion.38 In the 1990s, anti-choice activists
34. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 72–75 (questions from Justice
Kavanaugh).
35. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action, supra note 3, ¶ 18.
36. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 551 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 545.
38. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740 (2021);
see Maya Manian, Privatizing Bans on Abortion: Eviscerating Constitutional Rights
Through Tort Remedies, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 123, 125 (2007).
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organized campaigns to target providers with medical malpractice,
wrongful death, informed consent, and similar civil claims.39 The goal was
to use actual or threatened litigation, liability, and damages to increase
malpractice-insurance costs, making it prohibitively expensive to provide
abortion services or driving providers from the field.40 These efforts differ
from SB8 in that they involved ordinary tort claims, in which the plaintiff
was the patient or the patient’s survivor seeking to remedy a cognizable
medical injury. This strategy did not achieve the desired comprehensive
restriction on abortion, and anti-choice activists abandoned it in favor of
direct attacks on Roe and Casey.41
Nor does SB8 represent the first example of expansive citizen standing
authorizing “any person” to sue, regardless of any personal injury, interest, or connection to the challenged conduct. California tried this in its
consumer-protection statutes, although supplementing rather than displacing public enforcement.42
SB8 combines exclusivity, private enforcement, and broad citizen
standing. By melding exclusive private enforcement with an unbounded
“any person” cause of action, Texas sought to achieve three things: prevent providers from pursuing offensive pre-enforcement injunctive litigation; allow the threat of massive litigation and liability to chill the exercise
of constitutional rights; and compel compliance with a clearly constitutionally invalid law pending the initiation and completion of defensive
litigation.43
A. SB8
The following key provisions of SB8 inform this Article:
1. Substantive Provisions
SB8 requires a reproductive-health provider to examine a patient for a
“detectable fetal heartbeat,” then prohibits the provider from performing
the abortion if either a fetal heartbeat is detected or the test has not been
performed, except in cases of medical emergency.44 Liability extends to
those who (1) perform or induce a prohibited abortion; (2) knowingly
39. ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 130, 173–74; Mary Ziegler, The Deviousness of Texas’s
New Abortion Law, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2021/09/deviousness-texass-new-abortion-law/619945 [https://perma.cc/4NNN4AMP].
40. Ziegler, supra note 39.
41. ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 130.
42. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17535 (repealed 2004); Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 661 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933,
1001–02 (2018); Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Mark Lee Dickson Paved the Way for the Texas
Abortion Ban, One Small Town at a Time, WASH. POST. (Sept. 16, 2021, 9:29 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/mark-dickson-texas-abortion-ban/2021/09/16/bb773a0a0c02-11ec-a6dd-296ba7fb2dce_story.html [https://perma.cc/UM2P-5UDX].
44. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.203–171.205. SB8 also requires physicians to keep records regarding these determinations. See id. §§ 171.008, 171.203(d),
171.205(b)–(c).
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engage “in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of
an abortion,” including through financial support for the abortion; and
(3) “intend” to perform, induce, or aid a prohibited abortion.45 It is irrelevant whether an individual engaging in, or intending to engage in, aiding-or-abetting conduct “knew or should have known that the abortion
would be performed or induced in violation” of the prohibition on postheartbeat abortions.46
2. No Public Enforcement
The law prohibits enforcement by the state, any political subdivision of
the state, district and county attorneys, and any executive or administrative officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision.47 The ban
“shall be enforced exclusively” through private civil actions.48
3. Private Enforcement
SB8 deputizes “[a]ny person, other than an officer or employee of a
state or local governmental entity,” to bring a civil action against any person who performs, aids or abets, or intends to perform or aid a prohibited
abortion.49 The plaintiff need not allege or prove personal injury to obtain a remedy.50 The plaintiff can obtain injunctive relief to prevent future violations (that is, future post-heartbeat abortions), an award of
statutory damages of at least $10,000 per prohibited abortion, and costs
and attorney’s fees.51 One person may recover for one abortion; “a court
may not award” further relief for one abortion when the defendant has
paid the full statutory damages for that abortion.52
4. Procedural Limitations
SB8 imposes unique procedures on the private civil action, which Justice Sotomayor criticized as “anomalies” designed to “make litigation
uniquely punitive for those sued.”53
Venue is proper in a Texas plaintiff’s county of residence, regardless of
the defendants’ location,54 expanding ordinary Texas rules placing venue
in a defendant’s county of residence or the county in which a substantial
part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.55 The plaintiff’s venue
45. Id. § 171.208(a).
46. Id. § 171.208(a)(2).
47. Id. § 171.207(a). Nor can a state official or local district or county attorney intervene in a pending action, although filing an amicus curiae brief is allowed. Id. § 171.208(h).
48. Id. § 171.207(a).
49. Id. § 171.208(a). A male impregnating the woman through rape, sexual assault,
incest, or other sexual crimes cannot bring a claim. Id. § 171.208(j).
50. Id. § 171.208(a).
51. Id. § 171.208(b).
52. Id. § 171.208(c).
53. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 546 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
54. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.210.
55. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 15.002(a).
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choice cannot be disturbed without written consent of all parties, including the plaintiff.56 These venue provisions add to the cost and burden by
requiring providers to defend themselves hundreds of miles from home.
The statute eliminates common law defenses of non-mutual issue and
claim preclusion.57 If X sues Planned Parenthood over one abortion and
loses, Whole Woman’s Health cannot gain the preclusive benefits of that
judgment to defeat X’s subsequent lawsuit against it.
Finally, statutory fee-shifting runs one way. An SB8 defendant cannot
recover attorney’s fees or costs from a plaintiff as a sanction for unsuccessful, groundless, or baseless lawsuits.58
5. Limitations on Defenses
SB8 purports to limit defenses available to providers, leading the plaintiffs in Whole Woman’s Health to deride the state proceedings as
“rigged”59 into a “mechanism for nullifying” constitutional rights.60
The statute denies provider and advocate defendants standing to assert
the rights of women seeking an abortion unless the Supreme Court of the
United States holds that Texas courts must confer such standing under
the U.S. Constitution or the defendant has third-party standing to assert
women’s rights under the tests established by the Supreme Court.61 This
limitation seizes on Justice Thomas’s recent argument that providers
should not have standing to challenge the validity of abortion regulations
that violate the constitutional rights of their pregnant patients.62
Defendants cannot avoid liability through their belief that SB8 is constitutionally invalid or their reliance on a then-existing judicial decision
establishing its invalidity that is overruled.63 The “undue burden” test
governing the validity of abortion restrictions forms an affirmative defense that considers whether an award of relief against that defendant will
prevent or impose a substantial obstacle on the overall ability to obtain
an abortion.64
56. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.210(b).
57. Id. § 171.208(e)(5).
58. Id. § 171.208(i). While prohibiting awards to defendants of “costs or attorney’s fees
under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or any other rule adopted by the supreme court,”
SB8 does not appear to cover statutory sanctions for signing a “frivolous pleading or motion.” See CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 10.001–.006.
59. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action, supra note 3, ¶¶
80–85.
60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4.
61. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.209(a).
62. See June Med. Servs., Inc. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2143 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321–22 (2016) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
63. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.208(e)(2)–(3).
64. See id. § 171.209(c)–(d); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992).
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SB8 took effect on September 1, 2021.65 Providers and reproductivefreedom supporters pursued offensive litigation efforts, in ordinary and
unusual ways.
Adhering to the typical playbook, providers sued numerous government officials and others in federal court. Following a series of procedural
rulings through multiple levels of the federal judiciary, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari before judgment.66 On expedited briefing and
argument, a divided Court rejected most claims, allowing providers (but
not other plaintiffs) to pursue limited relief against state licensing
boards.67 The Court rejected claims against state judges and state clerks68
that would have allowed federal courts to stop SB8’s primary enforcement mechanism—private suits in state court by “any person” plaintiffs.
While Whole Woman’s Health was pending, the Biden Administration
sued Texas to enjoin enforcement of the law. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction prohibiting any actions by anyone connected to
the State of Texas that might enforce or result in the enforcement of
SB8.69 That injunction offered two days of relief from the risk of enforcement, during which some providers resumed pre-viability, post-heartbeat
abortions.70 The Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal.71 After granting certiorari before judgment and expedited briefing and argument, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.72
Providers also filed fourteen offensive actions in state court, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement by named pro-life
organizations and advocates.73 The Texas Panel of Multi-District Litigation assigned the cases to Judge Peeples, who declared that specific procedural mechanisms in SB8 violated the Texas Constitution,74 without
65. Bills Effective on September 1, 2021, TEX. LEGISLATURE, https://capitol.texas.gov/
Reports/Report.aspx?LegSess=87R&ID=effectivesept1 [https://perma.cc/X7CL-DF9K].
66. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 415, 415–16 (2021) (mem.).
67. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 538–39 (2021); Wasserman &
Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1060–63. Answering a certified question from the Fifth Circuit,
the Texas Supreme Court held that state licensing boards had no authority to enforce SB8.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 65 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 625 (March 11, 2022).
68. Whole Woman’s Health, 142 S. Ct. at 531–33; Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27,
at 1064–77.
69. United States v. Texas, No. 1:21-CV-796-RP, 2021 WL 4593319, at *53 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 6, 2021).
70. See Karen Brooks Harper, At Least One Major Texas Abortion Provider Resumes
Procedure Lawmakers Tried to Prohibit, After Judge Blocks Near-Total Ban, TEX. TRIB.
(Oct. 7, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/10/07/Texas-abortion-law-providers [https://perma.cc/4ST7-EK6B].
71. United States v. Texas, No. 21-50949, 2021 WL 4786458, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 14,
2021).
72. United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.). Justice Sotomayor noted her
dissent. See id.
73. See Van Stean v. Tex. Right to Life, No. D-1-GN-21-004179, slip op. at 31–34 (98th
Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 9, 2021).
74. See id.

198

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

enjoining enforcement. Any subsequent injunctive relief remain limited
to stopping enforcement by the named organizations, not by the
thousands of non-party deputized “any persons.”
Without the protection of injunctive relief, most providers complied
with the law, ceasing or limiting abortions to those in which no heartbeat
was or could be detected.75 Mark Dickson, the head of East Texas Right
to Life and leading SB8 proponent, argued that “[n]o rational abortion
provider would violate this law.”76 He was correct, as abortion after the
sixth week of pregnancy became largely unavailable in the state,77 and
the number of abortions performed in the state dropped by more than
half.78
That absence of prohibited post-heartbeat abortions prevented defensive litigation. If no one violates the law, “any person” cannot sue over
any violation; if “any person” does not sue, providers cannot raise and
litigate constitutional defenses and courts cannot declare the heartbeat
ban invalid and stop its enforcement. And that might have been the
point. The anti-choice movement stood in a better position if no one filed
suit, allowing the risk of a barrage of lawsuits, judgments, and substantial
damages to keep providers from performing health care as usual. Activists achieved their goals if the inchoate threat of lawsuits, liability, and
damages chilled providers into ceasing abortion services.79
That changed after several weeks. Dr. Braid published his op-ed in the
Washington Post announcing that he had performed one first-trimester
post-heartbeat abortion.80 Three lawsuits followed in Texas state court,81
providing the necessary test cases and the opportunity to present SB8’s
constitutional invalidity as a defense to liability in those actions. The
75. See Paul J. Weber & Jessica Gresko, Explainer: The Texas Abortion Law’s Swift
Impact, and Future, AP NEWS (Sept. 16, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/health-austintexas-lawsuits-coronavirus-pandemic-e4352ad8f095612ac249bb8477ddc637 [https://
perma.cc/CT93-QWSY]; Neelam Bohra, Fearful of Being Sued Under New Law, Three of
Four San Antonio Abortion Facilities Stop Offering the Procedure, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 7,
2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/09/07/texas-abortion-law-san-antonio
[https://perma.cc/BA3K-97EX].
76. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 4.
77. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 545 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Transcript of Oral Argument at 67,
United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.) (No. 15-674) [hereinafter Texas Transcript of Oral Argument] (statement of Justice Kagan), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/21-588_m648.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJJ2VX7W].
78. Texas Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 66–67; Paul J. Weber, Abortions in Texas Fell by 60 % in 1st Month Under New Limits, ASSOC. PRESS (Feb. 10, 2022),
https://apnews.com/article/abortion-health-texas-b92eadbe4afd4d29cb6cbf00526c11b0?
utm_campaign=socialFlow&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=ap [https://perma.cc/
5E2Q-RUBA].
79. See, e.g., Ruth Graham, Adam Liptak & J. David Goodman, Lawsuits Filed
Against Texas Doctor Could Be Best Tests of Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/us/texas-abortion-lawsuits.html? [https://perma.cc/
33TE-UDPD].
80. Braid, supra note 30; see also Levenson, supra note 30.
81. See generally Tex. Heartbeat Project Complaint, supra note 31; Stilley Complaint,
supra note 31; Gomez Complaint, supra note 31.
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plaintiffs formed a varied, unique, and quirky group.82 One was an attorney from Illinois facing disciplinary sanctions in federal and state court
who supported abortion-rights and wanted to create the necessary litigation.83 One was an Arkansas citizen, disbarred attorney, and federal tax
convict under house arrest, who claimed to be interested in both the
money (he sought $100,000, ten times the statutory minimum) and creating the opportunity for litigation.84 The third was an anti-choice advocacy
group interested in stopping abortion and critical of other SB8 plaintiffs
for co-opting SB8 in a way the legislature and activists did not intend.85
III. LITIGATING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. SB8

AND

ITS CRITICS

Critics’ foundational error is the belief that SB8 violates constitutional
rights by existing as a law of Texas, restricting pre-enforcement review
and obligating rights holders and providers acting on their behalf to defend against potential enforcement.
That presumption runs throughout the rhetoric of SB8 critics. Advocates complained of a “brazen defiance of the rule of law and the federal
constitutional rights to which Texans are entitled.”86 They complained
that SB8 thwarts “traditional mechanisms of federal judicial review,”87
evades “effective judicial protection of that right in federal and state
court,”88 and strips “citizens of the ability to invoke the power of the
82. See Vivia Chen, Meet the Quirky Plaintiffs Suing Under the Texas Abortion Law,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2021, 10:31 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloom
berglawnews/us-law-week/X3DOR0VK000000?bna_news_filter=US-law-week#jcite
[https://perma.cc/LJ5C-MMJA].
83. See In re Felipe Nery Gomez, Synopsis of Hearing Board Report and Recommendation, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION (Jan. 2022), http://
iardc.org/File/View/1458030?FileName=IN%20re%20Felipe%20Nery%20
Gomez%2C%20Attorney%20Number%206197210.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSL7-A5KR]; In
re Felipe Nery Gomez Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission Judgment (Apr.
8, 2021), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/mopanwqzlva/IL%20Supreme
%20Court%20order%20on%20Gomez%20suspension.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH29-646P];
Ed Kilgore, Two Disbarred Out-of-State Lawyers Might Blow Up the Texas Abortion Law,
N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 22, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/09/ex-attorney-on-housearrest-might-blow-up-texas-abortion-law.html [https://perma.cc/VFT4-5VT9]. This plaintiff
nonsuited three months after filing. Gomez Notice of Non-Suit Without Prejudice, Gomez
v. Braid, No. 2021CI19920 (224th Dist. Ct. Bexar County, Tex., filed December 8, 2021);
Amended Notice of Dismissal Dismissing With Prejudice, No. 2021CI19920 (224th Dist.
Ct. Bexar County, Tex., filed December 20, 2021).
84. Kilgore, supra note 83.
85. See Plea in Intervention and Plea to the Jurisdiction as to Collusive Lawsuit by
Out-of-State Plaintiff, Stilley v. Braid, No. 2021-CI-19940 (438th Dist. Ct., Bexar County,
Tex. Sept. 21, 2021), https://bustingthefeds.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/IntervenePldBraid.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEL8-B5LP]. Braid countered these lawsuits by suing those individuals in federal court. See Complaint for Interpleader and Declaratory Judgment,
Braid v. Stilley, No. 1:21-cv-05283 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2021).
86. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action, supra note 3, ¶¶
17–19.
87. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 4.
88. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 3.
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federal courts to vindicate their rights.”89
That rhetoric carried to the Court’s minority in Whole Woman’s
Health. Dissenting from the denial of emergency relief on the day SB8
took effect, Justice Breyer suggested that “[t]he very bringing into effect
of Texas’s law may well threaten the applicants with imminent and serious harm.”90 Chief Justice Roberts objected that SB8 “effectively chill[s]
the provision of abortions in Texas”91 by “employ[ing] an array of stratagems designed to shield its unconstitutional law from judicial review,”92
with the purpose and effect to “nullify this Court’s rulings.”93 Justice
Sotomayor argued that the law’s “chilling effect has been near total, depriving pregnant women in Texas of virtually all opportunity to seek
abortion care within their home State after their sixth week of pregnancy.”94 SB8 “is structured to thwart review and result in ‘a denial of
any hearing.’”95 And she criticized the majority for “reward[ing] the
State’s effort at nullification,”96 thereby “betray[ing] not only the citizens
of Texas, but also our constitutional system of government.”97
None of this reflects how constitutional litigation operates. As the Supreme Court explained in Massachusetts v. Mellon:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on
the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such
an act.98
The mere existence of a law, absent a genuine risk of enforcement,
does not violate anyone’s rights, or in the language of § 1983, deprive any
person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution.99 A
law violates a constitutional right and causes a constitutional injury
through its enforcement.100 A violation arises not from the “mere enactment” or existence of a constitutionally violative law, but from the enforcement of that constitutionally violative law and imposition of liability,
punishment, or sanction against a rights holder through adjudicative pro89. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 15.
90. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2496 (2021) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
91. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 544 (2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 543.
93. Id. at 545.
94. Id. (Sotomayor J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 548.
96. Id. at 551.
97. Id. at 546.
98. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); see also California v. Texas, 141
S. Ct. 2104, 2113–14 (2021); see also Mitchell, supra note 43, at 936; Howard M. Wasserman, Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial Departmentalism: A Model of
Constitutional Adjudication, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1077, 1083–84 (2020).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
100. See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. at 2115–16; Wasserman, supra note 98, at
1083–84.
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ceedings.101 A rights holder cannot prevail in court on the “naked contention” that a law violates rights “by the mere enactment of the statute,
though nothing has been done and nothing is to be done” to enforce that
law.102
Judicial review consists of adjudicating a controversy, declaring the validity of that law,103 and the “negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment” by not allowing that invalid rule to serve as a rule of
decision.104 Courts cannot repeal, eliminate, or erase a statute.105 Despite
the common rhetoric, courts do not “strike down” or “block” laws or
prevent them from taking effect. Courts in offensive litigation enjoin not
laws but their enforcement.106 The court issues an order prohibiting the
opposing party from enforcing the challenged law against the party rights
holder at present and in the future.107
The Constitution also does not immunize rights holders from litigating
attempted enforcement of even a blatantly invalid law; it protects them
against liability and sanction under that blatantly invalid law. Having declared the law invalid, the court will not allow that law to be used as an
applicable rule of decision.108 But judicial review requires litigation,
through which the court can adjudicate the constitutional question, declare the validity of the law, pronounce its enforceability, and decide
whether the rights holder can be liable under that law.
B. OFFENSIVE LITIGATION

AND

DEFENSIVE LITIGATION

Courts adjudicate constitutional questions and decide on a law’s constitutional validity in two contexts: offensive or defensive.109
101. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 535; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
507 (1961); Mellon, 262 U.S. at 483; Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Fla., 8
F.4th 1198, 1202–03 (11th Cir. 2021); Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1083–85.
102. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 483.
103. See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. at 2115–16; Mitchell, supra note 43, at 936;
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383, 417–18
(2018); Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1083–84; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1273–74 (1996).
104. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488.
105. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417, 451–52 (2017); Mitchell, supra note 43, at 935–36; Wasserman, supra
note 98, at 1089–90; see Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 535 (2021); Seila
L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2220 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 535; California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct.
at 2115–16.
107. See Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2020); Hartnett v. Pa. State
Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2020); John Harrison, Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act Does Not Call for Universal Injunctions or Other Universal Remedies, 37
YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 37, 43 (2020); John Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 87–88 (2014); Mitchell, supra note 43, at
936; Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1090–91.
108. Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1089.
109. Id. at 1086, 1088.
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1. Offensive Litigation
A rights holder proceeds in an offensive posture by initiating litigation
to remedy past, present, or future enforcement. To stop present or future
enforcement, a rights holder brings suit under § 1983110 and the Ex parte
Young equitable cause of action,111 typically in federal district court,
against the government or (more commonly) the executive officers responsible for enforcing the law. The rights holder seeks a declaratory
judgment112 that the law is constitutionally invalid, an injunction prohibiting enforcement of that law by this enforcer defendant against this rights
holder plaintiff, or both.113 A rights holder can remedy past violations
through a § 1983 action following completion of state enforcement, seeking damages or other retroactive remedies.114
2. Defensive Litigation
Defensive or coercive litigation occurs within adjudicative proceedings
enforcing the challenged law. Proceedings are initiated against a rights
holder, who raises the constitutional defect in the law as a defense and
argues for dismissal or a favorable judgment in that proceeding because
the law being enforced is constitutionally invalid and cannot form the
basis for liability.115 These actions are coercive because the party initiating the action seeks to enforce and secure a remedy under the challenged
law; the rights holder wields the Constitution as a defensive shield against
liability.116
Government enforces laws through criminal,117 civil,118 or administrative119 proceedings. Alternatively, many laws are enforced through private civil litigation—a private individual sues to enforce a statutory or
common law right and the defendant challenges that law’s constitutional
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
111. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2015); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
113. See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112–13, 2117 (2020); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300–01 (2016); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644, 675–76 (2015); Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 861–62 (1997);
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
454–55, 475 (1974); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 191; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
114. Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1088–89; see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 267–68 (1981); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
115. See John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513, 2516–18 (1998).
116. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 538 (2021).
117. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 214 (2011); United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 466–67 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
118. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 176
(2012); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594–98 (1975).
119. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1725
(2018); Ohio C.R. Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 621 (1986); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 427–29 (1982).
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validity and thus enforceability. This includes private claims for defamation,120 intentional infliction of emotional distress,121 other torts,122 right
of publicity,123 breach of contract,124 privacy rights,125 property rights,126
and employment discrimination.127
3. Judgments and Opinions
Offensive and defensive postures share one trait—they produce retail
judgments and remedies. The judgment in a defensive case resolves that
enforcement action against that rights holder. The court denies the enforcing party (the government or private plaintiff) its requested remedy
and enters judgment in favor of the defending rights holder. The court
does not provide the rights-holder defendant any affirmative remedy beyond the favorable judgment declining to hold her liable under the constitutionally defective law. The injunction in an offensive case prohibits
present and future enforcement of the invalid law by the enforcer defendants against the rights-holder plaintiffs. The injunction binds the parties,
their officers and agents, and “other persons who are in active concert or
participation” with the parties.128 It protects the plaintiff rights holder
from future enforcement, but should not extend beyond that to protect
the universe of nonparties who share similar rights or interests with the
parties and who may be subject to future enforcement.129 An injunction
“should be no more burdensome . . . than necessary to provide complete
relief to the plaintiff[ ]” and should be commensurate with and match the
constitutional violation.130 An injunction protecting the plaintiff rights
holder against future enforcement, regardless of future enforcement
against other rights holders, provides that complete and commensurate
relief.
120. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768–70 (1986); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 256 (1964).
121. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448–50 (2011); Hustler Mag., Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988); Gerber v. Herskovitz, 14 F.4th 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2021).
122. See, e.g., Thunder Studios, Inc. v. Kazal, 13 F.4th 736, 739–40 (9th Cir. 2021).
123. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003); see also Robert C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman,
The First Amendment and the Right(s) of Publicity, 130 YALE L.J. 86, 95–96 (2020).
124. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 666 (1991); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 251 (1953).
125. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526–28 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S 469, 471–74 (1975).
126. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–7 (1948); Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Vaught, 8 F.4th 714, 717–18 (8th Cir. 2021).
127. See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055–59
(2020); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
176–80 (2012); Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1240–41 (10th Cir.
2010); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 592–93 (5th Cir.
1995); Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 947, 961 (S.D. Iowa 1990).
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
129. Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1094.
130. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); accord Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 357 (1996); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293–94 (1976); Wasserman, supra note 98,
at 1094.
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Any judgment, offensive or defensive, is accompanied by an opinion,
an essay explaining and justifying the judgment.131 That opinion protects
nonparty rights holders and governs nonparty enforcers in actual or
threatened future enforcement through its precedential value. It compels
or persuades (depending on the level of court) future courts in future
proceedings to reach the same conclusion about the law’s constitutional
invalidity and to reject enforcement against a new set of rights holders.132
The law of the opinion and precedent, rather than the judgment in the
first action, protects future rights holders. The Supreme Court has established major constitutional precedent in offensive133 and defensive134
postures.
C. DEFENSIVE LITIGATION AS ORDINARY MECHANISM
JUDICIAL REVIEW

OF

FEDERAL

The prevailing theme in the SB8 debate is that defensive litigation is
insufficient and Texas violated the rule of law by channeling constitutional challenges to a defensive posture.135 In insisting there must be
“not-very-new procedural bottles that can also adequately hold what is, in
essence, very old and very important legal wine,”136 Justice Breyer envisioned an offensive procedural bottle, anything else being insufficient.
Offensive litigation offers rights holders procedural and remedial advantages.137 It is required as to specific laws enforced outside of adjudicative
proceedings, such a law prohibiting Black students from attending public
schools or prohibiting same-sex couples from obtaining marriage
licenses.138
But Whole Woman’s Health recognized pervasive defensive litigation
as constitutionally sufficient:
[T]hose seeking to challenge the constitutionality of state laws are
not always able to pick and choose the timing and preferred forum
for their arguments. This Court has never recognized an unqualified
right to pre-enforcement review of constitutional claims in federal
court. . . . To this day, many federal constitutional rights are as a
131. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 62 (1993).
132. William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1844 (2008); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 923 n.31
(2011); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2000); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH.
L. REV. 179, 185–86 (2014); Lawson & Moore, supra note 103, at 1327; Merrill, supra note
131, at 43–45, 62; Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1108–09.
133. Cases cited supra notes 113–114.
134. Cases cited supra notes 117–127.
135. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 546–47 (2021) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2498 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
136. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S Ct. at 2497 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1052–54.
138. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 652 (2015); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954); Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1052.
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practical matter asserted typically as defenses to state-law claims, not
in federal pre-enforcement cases like this one.139
Treating offensive litigation as the “norm” for judicially enforced
laws—to say nothing of treating defensive litigation as a non-viable
means for vindicating constitutional rights—is a recent phenomenon.
Prior to the late 1970s, more cases reached the Supreme Court from a
defensive than an offensive posture; offensive cases outnumbered defensive cases for the first time in the two-year period from 1974 to 1976.140
These numbers support that defensive constitutional litigation is a “traditional mechanism of federal judicial review” through which the Court has
issued several watershed constitutional opinions,141 such that having to
litigate SB8 cases defensively is neither unheard of nor constitutionally
intolerable.
SB8 is extreme. It establishes a new substantive rule that intentionally
and unequivocally contradicts existing judicial precedent. The universe of
potential plaintiffs is unbounded and limitless, enabling a barrage of lawsuits by random individuals without injury or connection to the challenged abortion and rendering defense prohibitively expensive. Liability
is steep. But these are differences of degree, not kind. It should not affect
the process through which constitutional validity is litigated and
adjudicated.
Arguing that defensive litigation is inherently inadequate to challenge
a statute such as SB8 rests on two false constitutional premises: that rights
holders are constitutionally entitled to litigate their constitutional rights
in an offensive posture and that due process incorporates Article III’s
injury requirement, such that the Constitution prohibits states from creating private rights of action absent personal injury. Five situations, outside
of abortion, debunk both presumptions and demonstrate why the Whole
Woman’s Health majority was correct to reject those arguments.
1. Private Civil Litigation
Many private rights—statutory and common law—are enforced via private civil litigation subject to constitutional limitations or defenses.142 The
private plaintiff brings a claim, and the defendant rights holder raises the
Constitution as a defense to liability. In none of these cases could a constitutional rights holder go on the offensive to stop enforcement before it
begins, as no state executive or public official enforces the law. Having
139. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 537–38 (2021).
140. Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: The Plenary Docket in
the 1970’s, 58 OR. L. REV. 3, 38, 39 tbl.VII, 40, 41 tbl.IX (1979) [hereinafter Hellman,
Supreme Court and Civil Rights]; Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National
Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 521, 577–78,
580 tbl.XI (1983) [hereinafter Hellman, National Law].
141. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 538; supra notes 117–27 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 117–27 and accompanying text.
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allegedly violated the law, the rights holder must get sued and raise her
constitutional rights as a defense.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan143 illustrates this procedural posture.
The plaintiff, a Montgomery elected official, sued for defamation in Alabama court, winning a $500,000 judgment; the Times raised the First
Amendment as an unsuccessful defense in state litigation before prevailing on those arguments before the Supreme Court of the United
States.144
Sullivan’s was one of five lawsuits arising from one publication, seeking
$3 million in damages.145 Those lawsuits formed part of a broader campaign among southern public officials and social leaders to utilize plaintiff-friendly state defamation laws and state-court civil litigation as a tool
for silencing civil rights leaders and the national press covering civil rights
protests and exposing the racist face of Jim Crow.146 And it worked for a
time. By the early 1960s, the pile of potential southern libel judgments
against media outlets approached $300 million (more than $2.7 billion in
2021),147 and the threat of litigation prompted the Times to remove its
reporters from Alabama for more than a year.148
The analogy to SB8 is unmistakable.149 Texas lawmakers sought to use
private civil litigation in state court to deter locally unpopular-but-constitutionally protected activity through the threat of multiple big-money
lawsuits and judgments. They presumed and hoped that plaintiffs would
prevail in some or all these cases, breaking providers under the weight of
devastating litigation costs and judgments or causing them to abandon
the state rather than face the wave of lawsuits and liability. This would
destroy access to reproductive-health care in the state, as Alabama officials hoped to stop media coverage of Jim Crow’s racist violence.150 And
it has worked so far. Providers stopped performing prohibited post-heartbeat abortions, abortion after the sixth week of pregnancy became largely
unavailable in Texas, and the number of abortions performed dropped by
143. See 376 U.S. 254, 262–64 (1964).
144. Id. at 256, 262–64.
145. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35 (1st ed. 1991).
146. See id. at 35–36; LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN
21 (2014); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning
of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 200; Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of
New York Times v. Sullivan, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 229, 229, 237–38 (Richard W.
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012); Howard M. Wasserman, A Jurisdictional Perspective on New York Times v. Sullivan, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 901, 909 (2013).
147. LEWIS, supra note 145, at 36; Papandrea, supra note 146, at 237.
148. LEWIS, supra note 145, at 36.
149. We explore the parallel in the third article in this series. See generally Howard M.
Wasserman & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Solving the Procedural Puzzles of the Texas
Heartbeat Act and Its Imitators: New York Times v. Sullivan as Historical Analogue, 60
HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4029084 [https://perma.cc/X58D-2FA5].
150. See LEWIS, supra note 145, at 35–36.
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more than half.151
Critics distinguish SB8 because the heartbeat ban facially contradicts
controlling judicial precedent, whereas constitutional applications of defamation law are conceivable. But consider the privately enforced right of
publicity. Robert Post and Jennifer Rothman describe the “chaos” surrounding this tort, including disputes over whether this tort can exist
under the First Amendment and any applicable First Amendment limits
on the basic concept.152 They survey multiple approaches, describing
courts as “flailing about in a sea of inconsistent, vague, and unhelpful
First Amendment tests.”153 For our purposes, this flailing occurs in a defensive posture but never in an offensive posture—Post and Rothman describe cases in which a private person sues to vindicate its publicity rights
and the speaker defends by arguing that the First Amendment insulates
him from liability.
2. SB8 Predecessors
Texas is not the first state to attempt to enforce its laws through private
civil litigation by private actors devoid of personal injury or connection.
SB8 recalls a different historical analogue—California’s former consumer
protection and false-advertising laws and the litigation of Kasky v. Nike,
Inc.154
Prior to 2004, California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws
authorized “any person acting for the interests of . . . the general public”
to bring an action to enforce laws against false advertising and other consumer harms. The plaintiff need not have been injured by the specific
advertisement nor have any connection to the violation or the violator.155
Marc Kasky, a politically active consumer advocate,156 sued Nike in state
court for false advertising over press releases responding to and denying
reports about overseas factory working conditions; Nike defended by arguing that these statements, even if false, were noncommercial political
speech enjoying full First Amendment protection.157 The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nike’s press releases were commercial speech and subject to regulation under consumer protection laws if
false.158 After the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted,159 the case settled for more than $1.5 mil151. See Weber, supra note 78; supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
152. Post & Rothman, supra note 123, at 125–32.
153. Id. at 132.
154. See 45 P.3d 243, 249–50 (Cal. 2002).
155. Id. at 249–50 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17535 (West 2003)
(amended 2004)).
156. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free Speech Case That
Wasn’t, 54 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 965, 971 (2004).
157. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
158. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262–63; see also Collins & Skover, supra note 156, at 986–87;
Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 589, 591 (2005).
159. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam); Colins & Skover, supra
note 156, at 1014.

208

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

lion and recurring program funding of $500,000 per year.160
Like the Times in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan or right-of-publicity
defendants, Nike never contemplated or had an opportunity to pursue
offensive litigation. Nor did anyone suggest that Nike had a federal right
to do so or that requiring it to litigate defensively in state court thwarted
judicial review. Nike defended in state court, presenting its federal constitutional arguments for state-court adjudication and seeking ultimate review of the adverse state judgment in the Supreme Court, a typical and
acceptable strategy.
Similarities to SB8 remain obvious. California’s law opened Nike to
potential wide-ranging liability from anyone choosing to bring suit. Kasky
was as well-known as a consumer activist in California161 as are Mark Lee
Dickson or Texas Right to Life as anti-reproductive-freedom activists in
Texas.162 Kasky had no more connection to Nike’s statements163 than
Dickson has to any post-heartbeat abortion.164 Nike issued its statements
denying those labor practices having no idea who from among the millions of people in the state might sue,165 just as Whole Woman’s Health
has no idea who from among millions across the country might seek damages for one abortion.
Many expected Nike to establish precedent on the line between corporate political and commercial speech and the different protections accorded to each.166 That hope fizzled, partly due to the case’s unusual
procedural posture—it did not present the appropriate vehicle because
the plaintiff had no injury and no connection to the speech at issue.167
But Nike presented a significant First Amendment issue, no less important than the reproductive-freedom questions surrounding SB8’s heartbeat ban. And some commentators believed it was as obvious that Nike
had engaged in protected political speech for which it could not be liable168 as it is obvious that a state cannot prohibit abortions at six-weeks
of pregnancy.
Liberal and anti-corporate activists cheered Kasky’s victory and the
substantial monetary settlement it produced169 through a law authorizing
private civil litigation by “any person” absent personal injury, connection,
or interest. No one questioned whether California could empower a random person to sue to stop Nike’s alleged false statements or whether
160. Collins & Skover, supra note 156, at 1020.
161. See id. at 971.
162. See Wax-Thibodeaux, supra note 43.
163. See Collins & Skover, supra note 156, at 971.
164. See Wax-Thibodeaux, supra note 43.
165. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17535 (West 2003) (amended 2004); Morrison, supra note 158, at 651.
166. Morrison, supra note 158, at 631–32.
167. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. at 658–61 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 667–68
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial Speech,”
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 64–65.
169. Collins & Skover, supra note 156, at 988.
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Nike could be compelled to defend its First Amendment interests. Everyone accepted California’s law, including its enforcement, as valid.
But the propriety of a mechanism for enforcing state law cannot rest on
the political valence of the constitutional right exercised or on whether
one supports the interests of the target rights holders. One cannot cheer
private enforcement of California’s consumer protection laws and its outcome while criticizing SB8’s identical enforcement mechanisms and their
potential outcomes.
3. From Offense to Defense
Two situations—one historic and one ongoing—illustrate the common
use of defensive litigation when offensive litigation becomes unavailable
or impossible for various reasons. These examples demonstrate the ideological range on these procedural issues.
a. The Story of Connecticut’s Contraception Ban
In Poe v. Ullman170 in 1961, married couples and a doctor sued the
Connecticut attorney general, challenging the constitutional validity of
the state’s ban on married couples using contraception and on providing
advice and information about contraception to married couples.171 A Supreme Court plurality reasoned that the action was not ripe because the
plaintiffs could not show that the attorney general intended to immediately enforce the law, largely because the state had enforced it once in its
eighty years of existence despite open and notorious sales of contraception in the state.172 Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment and provided the controlling fifth vote.173 He argued that the married-couple
plaintiffs did not reasonably fear prosecution because the law did not target their purchase and use of contraception; the law aimed at institutional
clinics providing birth control on a large scale.174 The Court could address
the constitutional issue when the state enforced against the large clinics
with which the law was concerned, producing a real controversy for judicial resolution.175
Six months after Poe, Estelle Griswold, executive director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, was arrested and prosecuted
for providing contraception information to married couples.176 The violation was intentional, designed to create a test case by triggering enforcement against the type of clinic that Justice Brennan insisted was the law’s
170. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (plurality opinion).
171. Id. at 498–500.
172. Id. at 501–02.
173. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1932, 1950 (2019).
174. Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
175. Id.
176. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The
Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 513–14 (1989).
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real target.177 The Court reversed Griswold’s conviction on appeal from
the Connecticut Supreme Court, concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of married couples to learn about, access, and use
contraception.178
For our purposes, the point is that the “real controversy flare[d] up”179
in a defensive posture. Griswold violated the law (for the purpose of creating defensive litigation), Connecticut initiated criminal proceedings in
state court to enforce the law, Griswold defended on federal constitutional grounds, and the Court agreed with her position at the end of the
process, invalidating the state’s enforcement of the law and the imposition of criminal liability. In refusing to allow the offensive pre-enforcement litigation by potential clients, Poe forced Griswold into that
defensive position. But she was able to vindicate her interests and her
clients’ rights four years later.
b. The Story of Masterpiece Cakeshop
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
the Supreme Court held that baker Jack Phillips could not be administratively sanctioned under a state public-accommodations law for refusing to
bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, due in part to expressions of
religious animus within state civil-rights-commission proceedings.180
While that case was pending before the Court, transgender attorney
and activist Autumn Scardina requested a custom cake with a blue exterior and pink interior to celebrate her birthday and her male-to-female
transition.181 Phillips refused to make the requested cake, citing his First
Amendment objections to the message.182 Scardina filed a complaint with
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which found probable cause that
the bakery had discriminated because of her transgender status.183
Following the Supreme Court decision, Phillips went on the offensive,
filing an action in federal court to enjoin the Commission from proceeding with Scardina’s complaint, arguing the new proceeding violated his
First Amendment rights.184 The district court declined to abstain under
Younger v. Harris185 or to defer to the state administrative proceeding.186
The Commission dismissed the administrative action, likely recognizing
that the federal court would find the new proceeding violated Phillips’s
177.
178.
179.
180.
(2018);
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Bloom, supra note 176, at 511–12.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
See Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24
see also id. at 1736–37 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1236 (D. Colo. 2019).
Id.
Id. 1236–37.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1239–42; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1239–42.
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First Amendment rights and enjoin it.187 The absence of actual or
threatened enforcement of state law therefore deprived Phillips of his opportunity to pursue his constitutional rights in an offensive posture in federal court. The Commission would not enforce because the federal court
likely would enjoin such proceedings. But the absence of Commission enforcement eliminated Phillips’s federal offensive litigation.
With public enforcement off the table, Scardina filed a private statecourt action alleging discrimination under the state public accommodations law.188 Phillips defended on First Amendment free speech and free
exercise grounds.189 The state trial court rejected the defense and ruled
for the plaintiff, imposing a $500 penalty.190 In other words, the Commission staying its hand forced Phillips into defensive litigation (not his preferred posture) in state court (not his preferred forum), where his
constitutional defense failed.
Providers occupy the same procedural position as Phillips. The absence
of public enforcement means the absence of preemptive pre-enforcement
offensive litigation, forcing providers to raise their constitutional rights as
defenses in state court. Phillips faced this situation because the government declined to enforce in one case, whereas SB8 creates this situation
in all cases by precluding government enforcement in favor of exclusive
private civil litigation. But they rest on a shared understanding—there is
nothing procedurally improper about allowing private enforcement of
state law, about making a purported constitutional rights holder litigate
those rights defensively in that private civil action, or about eliminating
the opportunity to litigate in a rights holder’s preferred time, forum, and
posture.191
SB8 remains extreme in the boundless universe of potential plaintiffs
and the size of potential monetary liability. But a Masterpiece Cakeshop
situation could match SB8’s extremes. Imagine a coordinated campaign
in which hundreds of people request custom cakes from Masterpiece
Cakeshop with pro-LGBTQ+ messages and sue the bakery for $500
(rather than going through the Civil Rights Commission, which might be
enjoined from enforcement) when it refuses to fill their orders. While
each plaintiff would have suffered an injury (unlike most SB8 plaintiffs)
in the discriminatory denial of service, the injury is simple to establish—
one phone call requesting a custom cake knowing the bakery will refuse.
And where a reproductive-health provider can be liable one time to one
187. See Complaint ¶¶ 28–29, Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., No. 2019-CV32214 (Dist. Ct. Colo. June 15, 2021).
188. Id.
189. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint Under Colo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
12(b)(5), and 9(b) at 14–17, 23–25, Scardina, No. 2019-CV-32214.
190. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 27, Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop
Inc., No. 19-CV-32214 (Dist. Ct. Colo. June 15, 2021), https://adflegal.org/sites/default/files/
2021-06/Scardina%20v.%20Masterpiece%20-%20District%20court%20findings%20of%20fact%20and%20conclusions%20of%20law%20%206-16-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/C85C-9Z8V].
191. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 537–38 (2021).
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plaintiff for one abortion, Phillips could be liable for each cake he refuses
to bake. While the available damages are less than the $10,000 per abortion available under SB8,192 hundreds of $500 dollar judgments
accumulate.
4. SB8 Imitators
a. Direct Imitators
Two years after the Court dismissed cert in Nike and the case settled,
California voters amended state law,193 leaving enforcement to governments, government officials, and persons who had suffered personal injury and lost money or property from unfair competition.194 This change
could reflect conclusive rejection of private enforcement by uninjured
and disconnected plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, SB8 has prompted predictions or fears of imitators.
States have introduced, considered, or threatened copycat laws on abortion, firearms, and a range of issues.195 Justice Kavanaugh worried about
expanding the concept.196 In its complaint, Whole Woman’s Health raised
the prospect of this slippery slope:
Today it is abortion providers and those who assist them; tomorrow
it might be gun buyers who face liability for every purchase.
Churches could be hauled into far-flung courts to defend their religious practices because someone somewhere disagrees with them.
Same-sex couples could be sued by neighbors for obtaining a marriage license. And Black families could face lawsuits for enrolling
their children in public schools.197
As Justice Sotomayor closed her Whole Woman’s Health dissent:
New permutations of S. B. 8 are coming. In the months since this
Court failed to enjoin the law, legislators in several States have discussed or introduced legislation that replicates its scheme to target
locally disfavored rights. What are federal courts to do if, for example, a State effectively prohibits worship by a disfavored religious
minority through crushing “private” litigation burdens amplified by
skewed court procedures, but does a better job than Texas of disclaiming all enforcement by state officials? Perhaps nothing at all,
says this Court.198
192. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-602(1)(a) (West 2021), with TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(b)(2).
193. Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010).
194. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17535 (West 2021).
195. Supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
196. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 72–75 (questions from Justice
Kavanaugh).
197. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action, supra note 3, ¶ 18.
198. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 551 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
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Or consider a hypothetical law with a different political valence. A
state wants to eliminate public displays and expressions of racial inequality by creating a private tort action for “any person” over the presentation of a racially derogatory or discriminatory idea; remedies include
statutory damages of $10,000 per expression, attorney’s fees, and an injunction requiring removal of the offensive racist message. This law violates the freedom of speech as judicially interpreted (which protects racist
and racially offensive rhetoric outside some narrow categories)199 to the
same degree that SB8 violates the right to reproductive freedom.
The shared point of this law and SB8 is to threaten or sue rights holders
into silence or bankruptcy for engaging in constitutionally protected but
socially disfavored activity. A would-be speaker with a racially offensive
message (e.g., a person who intends to post an “All Lives Matter” sign on
her lawn)200 stands in the same position as a provider seeking to help
women terminate an unwanted pregnancy after detection of a fetal
heartbeat.
And the law creates identical circumstances to those under SB8. The
speaker cannot bring an offensive action to declare this law invalid or
stop its enforcement, as there is no responsible executive officer to sue
and no one for the court to enjoin. Whole Woman’s Health properly rejected the “court-and-clerk” theory of suing state clerks to prevent them
from filing or state judges to prevent them from adjudicating prospective
cases.201 The speaker must continue to present her racist message, get
sued by a random offended person, and raise the First Amendment as a
defense to tort liability. Or the speaker will refrain from posting the sign
for fear of suit and liability.
b. Tort Imitators
The slippery slope is not limited to Justice Sotomayor’s feared SB8type laws deputizing “any person” private plaintiffs to sue without personal injury. In fact, those laws may pose less of a threat, because rights
holders may be able to pursue some offensive federal litigation against
deputized “any persons.”202 The larger problem is that states could create
a range of clearly constitutionally invalid ordinary tort laws requiring
injury.
199. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764–65 (2017); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
366–67 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992); Zachary S. Price, Our
Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 817, 824 (2018); Charles W.
“Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON
HALL L. REV. 395, 407–18 (2014).
200. See Karen Stollznow, Why Is It So Offensive to Say “All Lives Matter”?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 13, 2021, 12:26 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-is-it-so-offensiveto-say-all-lives-matter-153188 [https://perma.cc/SCC2-V39T].
201. See Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1064; supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
202. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1077–83.
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Return to defamation and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.203 Commentators regard it as the Court’s most important free speech case and
the genesis of the modern speech-protective First Amendment.204 The
Court recognized the “profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.”205
But scholars,206 litigants,207 and judges208 have criticized the decision
and called for reconsidering or overruling it in a changing media, political, and expressive environment. Imagine that a state, observing and
agreeing with these criticisms, amends its defamation law to align with its
preferred policies, to expand the universe of speech that can form the
basis for civil liability, to create the litigation necessary to reconsider New
York Times and its progeny, and to establish a new First Amendment
regime.
That state might begin small, requiring the defendant to prove truth by
a preponderance of evidence, rather than the plaintiff prove falsity by
clear and convincing evidence.209 It might relax the “of and concerning”
element, allowing liability for speech that does not clearly identify the
plaintiff by name or description210 and expanding the universe of people
who might sue over false statements about general conduct. More
broadly, the state might confront the central holding of New York
Times—limiting the actual malice standard to public officials but inappli-

203. A majority of states lack criminal defamation laws and those that do rarely enforce
them; criminal defamation enforcement is thought of as “essentially dead,” although some
states might bring it back. See Eugene Volokh, What Cheap Speech Has Done: (Greater)
Equality and Its Discontents, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2303, 2313–15 (2021). Offensive litigation is possible to challenge a criminal defamation law and stop prosecution, providing
judicial precedent to defeat future civil actions. But a court may not let the offensive case
proceed given the unlikelihood of prosecution. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501–02
(1961) (plurality opinion).
204. LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 146, at 31; LEWIS, supra note 145, at 5–8; Kalven,
supra note 146, at 221 n.125; Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren
Court, 2010 SUP. CT. Rev. 59, 79; Papandrea, supra note 146, at 230.
205. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also LEVINE & WERMIEL,
supra note 146, at 28; Papandrea, supra note 146, at 248.
206. David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759, 761–62 (2020); David McGowan, A Bipartisan Case Against
New York Times v. Sullivan, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 509, 541 (2022); Papandrea, supra note
146, at 256–61.
207. Nunes v. Lizza, 12 F.4th 890, 899 (8th Cir. 2021); Coral Ridge Ministries, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 6 F.4th 1247 (11th Cir. 2021); Nunes v. WP Co., 513 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9–10
(D.D.C. 2020); Palin v. New York Times, 482 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
208. See, e.g., Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); id. at 2427–30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari); Tah v. Glob. Witness Publ’g, Inc., 991 F.3d 231, 251–56 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting in part).
209. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775–77 (1986).
210. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81–83 (1966); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 290–92 (1964); LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 146, at 17, 26, 28–30.
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cable to people merely because of their fame,211 or replacing actual malice with a lesser state of mind,212 so long as the plaintiff shows some
fault.213
Alternatively, that state might go big in its push towards a new First
Amendment. It might attempt to regulate “fake news,” proscribing
(through civil litigation) “deliberate, public communication as truthful of
a verifiably false and material statement of fact regarding a matter of
public concern,”214 despite First Amendment rejection of government
power to define political truth.215 It could make privately actionable expression of insulting, demeaning, or negative statements about government and public officials, regardless of truth or accuracy; such a law
ignores vital First Amendment protection for utterances that do not state
actual facts,216 the rule that government cannot proscribe publication of
truthful, lawfully obtained information,217 and the First Amendment’s
categorical rejection of seditious liable and actionable criticism of
government.218
As with SB8’s fetal-heartbeat ban, this revised defamation law suffers
from unavoidable constitutional defects. Each “flagrantly” and “patently” runs afoul of existing judicial precedent. Each opens the door to
broad liability for constitutionally protected conduct at the hands of a
broad range of plaintiffs. Each has a chilling effect on rights holders fearing suit and liability. Each enables a new campaign of burdensome litigation reminiscent of 1960s Alabama.
Yet none can be challenged offensively. The altered defamation
scheme would be enforced through private civil litigation, not by any
public official. No one would expect federal courts to enjoin court clerks
or state judges from allowing state litigation to proceed. A speaker or
media outlet challenges these laws defensively—publish violative statements, get sued, and raise the First Amendment as a defense.
5. Growing Demand for Offensive Litigation
The presumption of and demand for offensive constitutional litigation
is growing. Consider “ag-gag” laws,219 which attempt to restrain animal211. Logan, supra note 206, at 812; but see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
14–15 (1990); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
212. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
347–48 (1974); Logan, supra note 206, at 812; McGowan, supra note 206, at 541.
213. McGowan, supra note 206, at 541.
214. Alan K. Chen, Free Speech, Rational Deliberation, and Some Truths About Lies, 62
WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 367 (2020).
215. Id. at 379.
216. See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1990); Hustler Mag., Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51–52 (1988).
217. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
218. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 275–76 (1964); Kalven, supra note 146, at
204–05; Rhodes, supra note 199, at 416–17.
219. Rebecca Aviel, Remedial Commandeering, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2071–72
(2021); Alan K. Chen, Cheap Speech Creation, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2405, 2439 (2021).
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rights activists and other critics of commercial farming and slaughterhouse practices from engaging in undercover investigations to gather and
publicize those practices.220 Some states impose criminal penalties for recording on private property; groups challenge those laws via proper offensive actions to enjoin enforcement by responsible state executive
officials.221
Arkansas took a different approach. It prohibited knowingly gaining
access to a “nonpublic area of a commercial property” and engaging in
any act that “exceeds the person’s authority,”222 prohibiting animal-rights
groups from hiring investigators who obtain employment with the farm
not to work there but to collect information through observation and recording of business activities.223 The law gave the owner or operator of
that commercial property a private right of action for damages and equitable relief.224
The analogy to SB8 again should be clear. Arkansas watched states
attempt to regulate activist conduct and protect agricultural producers
through criminal law and it watched federal courts enjoin public enforcement through offensive litigation.225 It turned to tort law and private civil
enforcement in pursuit of that goal. Arkansas limited the civil action to
those whose property interests were harmed, rather than deputizing “any
person” with an axe to grind against animal-rights activists. But the
shared point is using the threat of civil litigation and liability to stop unwanted-but-constitutionally protected conduct.
The Animal Legal Defense Fund, an animal-welfare organization, demanded to litigate offensively and in federal court.226 It sued a chicken
slaughterhouse and a pig farm (owned by the state legislator who had
introduced and voted for the law); the Fund planned to send undercover
investigators into employment positions to investigate those businesses
and uncover evidence of wrongdoing.227 A divided Eighth Circuit held
that the Fund had standing and allowed the offensive action to proceed,
because the plaintiffs showed an imminent intent to investigate the defendant farms and a reasonable fear they would be sued for doing so.228
The court missed the mark in treating this as an ordinary offensive preenforcement action. The immediacy of the rights holder’s plans to engage
in prohibited-but-constitutionally protected conduct and the likelihood of
enforcement are relevant when a rights holder seeks to enjoin a responsi220. Aviel, supra note 219, at 2071–72; Chen, supra note 219, at 2439–40.
221. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 8 F.4th 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2021);
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2018); Aviel, supra
note 219, at 2072; Chen, supra note 219, at 2439–40.
222. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(b) (West 2017); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught,
8 F.4th 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2021).
223. Vaught, 8 F.4th at 717–18.
224. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113(b), (e); Vaught, 8 F.4th at 717, 721.
225. See supra note 221.
226. Vaught, 8 F.4th at 717–18.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 720–21; id. at 722 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
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ble executive-branch official from enforcing the law through public mechanisms.229 The court skipped the real and obvious problem with this
suit—neither private property owner/would-be tort plaintiff acted under
color of state law in pursuing civil litigation and remedies, therefore
neither was a proper target for an offensive § 1983 action.230 The owners
raised the issue in passing, but the majority passed this as a merits issue
for the district court to address in the first instance.231
Animal Legal Defense demonstrates that the presumption of offensive
litigation blinds plaintiffs and courts. The Fund took as a given that constitutional litigation is offensive and occurs pre-enforcement in federal
court and targets the potential enforcer, regardless of the nature of the
enforcer or enforcement. The court took as a given that offensive litigation is appropriate, subject to the threshold issue of the immediacy of
threatened enforcement, regardless of the nature of the enforcer or
enforcement.
***
During argument in Whole Woman’s Health, Texas Solicitor General
Judd Stone pushed the analogy between private SB8 litigation and tort
claims, including New York Times and Masterpiece Cakeshop.232 The
counter is that SB8 is not tort law, because tort law remedies personal
injuries, whereas anyone can be an SB8 plaintiff regardless of personal
harm or interest. But that distinction rests on two false premises.
The first is that the burden of defending private civil litigation to enforce constitutionally dubious laws is limited to SB8-type laws. The historic example of New York Times and the current examples of
Masterpiece Cakeshop, publicity torts, or the Arkansas ag-gag law belie
that premise.
The second is that due process incorporates Article III’s personal-injury requirement—the Constitution limits state power to decide who can
sue to enforce the state-law rights it creates, such that states can authorize
private suits only by those who have suffered injury in a “personal and
individual” manner as in federal court.233 But this has never been the law.
State courts are not governed by federal justiciability doctrines and can
allow plaintiffs to sue on broader or less personal injuries.234 This principle is so settled that it passes unmentioned. When California authorized
“any person” to sue in the public interest over false advertising—the clos229. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159–60 (2014) (citing Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)); Wasserman & Rhodes, supra
note 27, at 1055–57.
230. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991); Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980); Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1077–78.
231. Vaught, 8 F.4th at 721.
232. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 60–61.
233. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
234. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); CHARLES W. “ROCKY”
RHODES, THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION IN STATE AND NATION: COMPARATIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 91–97 (2014); infra Part IV.C.1.
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est previous analogue to SB8—Justices recognized that such a random
plaintiff would not have standing in federal court.235 But the Court never
suggested that California overstepped constitutional bounds by authorizing uninjured, disconnected individuals to sue in state court to enforce
state law.
Constitutional rights holders prefer to litigate offensively when possible, with good reason. Controlling the time, manner, and forum and
avoiding the risk of liability and sanction make it an attractive option. But
it is never the sole option. The examples in this Part demonstrate that
rights holders can, have, and at times must litigate significant constitutional issues in a defensive posture, including in state court. This includes
cases in which states authorize suit by random interested individuals without personal injury or stake and cases in which the state eliminates public
enforcement of the law or renders offensive challenges to enforcement
legally impossible.
Justice Breyer insisted there must be “not-very-new procedural bottles
that can also adequately hold what is, in essence, very old and very important legal wine.”236 While he did not acknowledge it, defensive litigation offers the procedural bottle to protect the old and important right to
reproductive freedom. Defensive litigation is consistent with the rule of
law, the Constitution, and federal judicial review. However unusual or
extreme in its substantive provisions, SB8 does not burden providers in
asserting constitutional rights in a way distinct from how comparable or
analogous defensive situations burden other rights holders.
This debate cannot escape the political valence of the constitutional
rights at issue. Political preferences may produce different reactions to
SB8 imitators. Many who decry the costs, burdens, and expenses that SB8
imposes on providers and their patients in having to proceed in a defensive posture would be concerned about an animal-welfare organization
having to defend a trespass claim. They may be less concerned that Nike,
a racist speaker, or Masterpiece Cakeshop is compelled to litigate its constitutional rights defensively in state court in the face of substantial liability. Many concerned about providers losing in state court may be pleased
that Phillips lost in state court. But procedural propriety cannot turn on
the substantive rights adjudicated or on one’s views of those substantive
rights.
Critics of the resolution of the Whole Woman’s Health litigation237 accused the Court of political hypocrisy. They presumed that the five-Justice majority would have enjoined a law with a different political valence
(e.g., California banning gun purchases and authorizing private damages
235. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 667
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
236. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S Ct. 2494, 2497 (2021) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
237. In re Whole Woman’s Health, 142 S. Ct. 701 (2022); Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021);
supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
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suits against gun owners) without worrying about proper defendants,
proper framing, or other procedural concerns. Whether that criticism is
accurate, the solution to perceived political inconsistency is not for the
Court to err more often. It is not that the Court was wrong in Whole
Woman’s Health, but that the Court would be wrong to grant relief in a
procedurally identical case. It should leave the similarly situated but
more-favored rights holders to litigate in the same defensive posture.
IV. DEFENSIVE LITIGATION
SB8’s exclusive reliance on private rather than public enforcement
keeps providers in a defensive posture. Unable to pursue offensive litigation to stop enforcement of the law, other than in limited contexts,238
providers wait for “any person” to commence an enforcement action for
damages and other relief. They then argue that the fetal-heartbeat ban is
constitutionally invalid and the enforcement action should be dismissed
or resolved in their favor; they cannot be liable for or subject to civil
remedies under a constitutionally invalid law. A favorable judgment does
not provide an affirmative remedy, such as an injunction protecting providers against future enforcement,239 only the end of the current enforcement effort. A possible federal forum remains at the end of this defensive
process through review of the final judgment of the state’s highest court
by the Supreme Court of the United States.240
This process requires two events—a provider must violate the law and
“any person” must sue that provider under the statute. In the early
months of SB8’s existence, neither was happening, other than Dr. Braid’s
single announced procedure and the three lawsuits that followed.241 Our
focus remains on SB8 and the process of defending those claims. But
many state laws are enforced through similar private litigation. SB8 copycats appear inevitable.
A. LOOKING

FOR A

LAWSUIT

With SB8 in effect and no broad injunction prohibiting enforcement,
providers had three options: obey the law and cease performing the prohibited procedures; continue medical practice as usual by performing prohibited pre-viability, post-heartbeat abortions and deal with the torrent of
lawsuits; or perform one post-heartbeat abortion to set up one “test case”
through which to litigate the constitutional question, while limiting potential liability.
238. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1060–64; see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
239. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1060–64.
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
241. Supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
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1. No Litigation, Just the Threat
Most providers followed the first approach. Deterred by the potential
for ruinous financial liability from a multitude of lawsuits and substantial
judgments, most providers complied with the law and ceased performing
post-heartbeat abortions, other than a brief two-day respite under the
United States v. Texas preliminary injunction.242 For anti-choice activists,
that was the point. They never intended or expected anyone to sue or to
enforce the law; the goal was to use the threat of expensive and burdensome litigation and liability to compel compliance with the ban and to
halt all post-heartbeat abortions (and thus a substantial share of all abortions) in the state.243 This placed providers in a bind. Without the option
of offensive litigation, they must litigate their rights defensively. But with
no actual civil action filed, they had no opportunity to do so.
This marks an important distinction between public and private enforcement. Offensive litigation allows rights holders to establish their
constitutional rights without having to act “at their peril” by engaging in
protected-but-statutorily prohibited conduct, violating the law, and subjecting themselves to the risks of arrest, prosecution, liability, and sanction.244 In Ex parte Young,245 the case that recognized offensive
constitutional litigation,246 the state argued that defensive litigation following a violation provided an adequate remedy at law precluding a federal suit in equity.247 The Court concluded that potential enforcement
harmed the railroad; the railroad need not wait for actual enforcement,248
because the state may choose not to pursue one isolated violation.249
The key is that government has a general obligation to enforce the
laws. It cannot avoid constitutional litigation by refusing to carry out that
obligation, while allowing the existence of the law to chill protected conduct. But thousands of unidentified private litigants do not carry that general obligation. Authorization to enforce a law through a private suit does
not impose a duty to enforce that law through a private suit.
2. Medical Practice as Usual
Anti-choice activists claim they never intended or expected lawsuits because pursuing litigation is costly and onerous for “any person” activists.250 But 85% to 90% of abortions in Texas prior to SB8 occurred post242. Supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
243. Graham, Liptak & Goodman, supra note 79; Mitchell, supra note 43, at 1002.
244. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
245. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
246. See James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte
Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2020).
247. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163.
248. Id. at 163–64.
249. Id. at 163.
250. Graham, Liptak & Goodman, supra note 79; supra note 243 and accompanying
text.
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heartbeat.251 It therefore seems likely that multiple lawsuits would have
followed medical practice as usual. Providers would have faced the costs
and burdens of multiple lawsuits across the state and the risk of multiple
judgments, damages, and attorney’s fees for multiple abortions. This explains the collective choice to cease statutorily prohibited abortions.
3. Single Abortion
Dr. Braid followed the third option, performing a single prohibited
abortion, and announced having done so.252 Compared with medical
practice as usual, he could control exposure and costs, committing to the
necessary money for defending and funding one case over one abortion.253 “Any person” can seek more than $10,000 in statutory damages
for that abortion,254 but exposure for one violation remains less than exposure for twenty violations. A single abortion can be the target of multiple lawsuits but only one recovery of statutory damages. This deters
multiple plaintiffs from suing over that one abortion; one “any person”
may decide that the cost of a lawsuit combined with the risk that another
“any person” might beat him to judgment exceeds the financial and ideological benefits of suing. The single abortion creates the venerable “test
case,” in which a rights holder intentionally violates a law to trigger enforcement and create the opportunity to adjudicate the constitutional issues in a defensive posture.255
But anti-choice activists may resist the bait. They may recognize that
refraining from suing deprives providers of the opportunity to defend and
litigate the constitutional issues. SB8 gives “any person” four years to
sue;256 potential plaintiffs may wait, hoping the Supreme Court overrules
or modifies Roe and Casey,257 allowing them to recover without having to
litigate SB8’s validity or litigating on easier jurisprudential terrain. If
most providers comply—that is, if the law succeeds in stopping postheartbeat abortion in the state—opponents might wait to target isolated
violators such as Dr. Braid until altered constitutional precedent supports
their cause.
251. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Class Action, supra note 3, ¶ 91.
252. Braid, supra note 30. A provider also could announce an intent to perform a prohibited abortion, which is actionable for injunctive relief and attorney’s fees, but not statutory damages if the intended abortion is not performed. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 172.208(b).
253. See Ilya Somin, Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Texas Abortion Ruling—and
How to Prevent It from Setting a Dangerous Precedent, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 2,
2021, 3:02 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/09/02/thoughts-on-the-supreme-courtstexas-abortion-ruling-and-how-to-prevent-it-from-setting-a-dangerous-precedent [https://
perma.cc/QK7X-9F3W].
254. See Stilley Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 27 (requesting $100,000 while noting that
the statutory minimum for money damages is $10,000).
255. Bloom, supra note 176, at 512–13; Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools, & Prophets: Justice
as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1332–32 (1995).
256. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.208(d).
257. Cf. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (granting certiorari in part); Dobbs Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8.
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4. Single Abortion, Friendly Plaintiffs
a. Friendly Plaintiffs
The solution is the friendly plaintiff—one not ideologically opposed to
abortion so not strategically inclined to maintain the chilling effect on
providers. “Any person,” unmodified by additional considerations or limitations, can bring a claim against anyone performing or aiding a violative
abortion.258 The statute does not limit the cause of action to “any person
ideologically opposed to reproductive freedom or otherwise wishing to
stop the practice of post-heartbeat abortion in Texas.”
SB8 proponents and anti-choice activists decried friendly lawsuits as
“stunts” or “plants,” abusing the cause of action259 in “bad faith, if not as
a joke.”260 Texas lawmakers perhaps presumed plaintiffs would share
their commitment to stopping abortion, but they did not write that presumption into the statute. “Any person’s” motivation for suing is irrelevant. A plaintiff may want money.261 A plaintiff may want to support
abortion rights by providing the test case through which providers can
defend and litigate their constitutional rights.262
SB8 supporters argued that friendly plaintiffs lack standing unless they
“sympathize[ ]” with the anti-choice movement, because they otherwise
are not adverse to the provider.263 But litigation requires legal adverseness, not political or ideological adverseness. It requires an opposition of
competing interests established by law. SB8 establishes legal adverseness
when the plaintiff is a person authorized to sue (that is, any natural or
artificial person) and the defendant is a provider who performed or aided
a prohibited abortion.264 Those adverse interests exist regardless of the
plaintiff’s ideological position on reproductive freedom.
The friendly plaintiff must act as a legally adverse party without giving
away the ideological game. She must proceed as an ordinary litigant asking the court for statutorily authorized relief, requiring the provider de258. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.208(a).
259. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 82; Graham, Liptak & Goodman, supra note 79; Tierney
Sweed & Ariane de Vogue, Texas Doctor Who Said He Performed Abortion Sued in First
Known Challenges Under New Law, CNN (Sept. 20, 2021, 10:36 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2021/09/20/politics/texas-abortion-doctor-lawsuit/index.html [https://
perma.cc/9M6C-MSZC].
260. Plea in Intervention and Plea to the Jurisdiction as to Collusive Lawsuit by Out-ofState Plaintiff, supra note 85, ¶ 3.
261. Stilley Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 27.
262. See Gomez Complaint, supra note 31.
263. Plea in Intervention and Plea to the Jurisdiction as to Collusive Lawsuit by Out-ofState Plaintiff, supra note 85, ¶ 1.
264. United States v. Windsor offers a federal analogy. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). The Internal
Revenue Service enforced the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage
as between one man and one woman for purposes of federal law, by denying Windsor the
marital exemption from the federal estate tax when her wife died. Windsor sued the
United States for a refund. While the Obama Administration’s litigation position was that
DOMA was constitutionally invalid, there was adverseness in the district court because
Windsor sought the tax exemption, the United States denied it, and the United States
refused to provide a refund. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753–58.
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fendant to litigate its interests and to challenge the constitutional validity
and enforceability of the heartbeat ban. The plaintiff cannot do the provider–defendant’s job for it.265 One pro-reproductive-freedom SB8 plaintiff made this mistake, using his complaint to ask the court to declare the
heartbeat ban invalid and illegal.266
It is unclear whether SB8 supporters or lawmakers anticipated the
friendly plaintiff strategy. But it counters strategic and deliberate nonenforcement. Reproductive-freedom opponents cannot stand idle and rely
on the law’s chilling effect to make legal abortion practically unavailable
in the state. Sophisticated and ideologically committed advocates do not
want SB8’s constitutional validity to be litigated by someone who does
not share their anti-choice values. They must sue to ensure zealous advocacy and that the task of litigating the constitutional issue is not left to
those who lack ideological commitment or legal competence.
The availability of friendly litigation distinguishes Ex parte Young and
shows why the Constitution does not require offensive litigation.267 The
opportunity for defensive litigation was not adequate in Young because a
single statutory violation might not trigger government prosecution or enforcement.268 The railroad in Young had no mechanism for forcing litigation through which it could defend. Providers have that mechanism; they
can guarantee enforcement and the opportunity to defend and challenge
the law’s constitutional validity by collaborating with willing ideologically
sympathetic but legally adverse plaintiffs.
b. Limiting the Friendly Plaintiff
Legislators might avoid the friendly plaintiff problem by limiting exclusive, private-enforcement causes of action in two ways, although neither
achieves the desire goal. First, the legislature could define eligible plaintiffs as “any person ideologically opposed to reproductive freedom or
otherwise wishing to stop abortion practices in the state.” But limiting the
cause of action to those holding certain political views violates the First
Amendment by discriminating because of political or ideological viewpoint in establishing legal rights or benefits.269
Ideological adverseness inheres in some statutory injuries. An environmental plaintiff likely holds environmental-protectionist political views
and wants to stop mercury discharge into public waters.270 But those
views are not necessary to the cause of action. A plaintiff could seek a
265. See Davis v. First Nat’l Bank of Waco, 161 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tex. 1941); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13.
266. See Gomez Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 4. This plaintiff nonsuited three months
after filing. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
267. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1057–58; supra notes 244–49 and accompanying text.
268. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908).
269. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
270. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–82
(2000).
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remedy if the discharge of mercury prevents her from using and enjoying
certain waters, even if she otherwise supports allowing hazardous-waste
incinerators to discharge mercury without close environmental
oversight.271
This becomes more obvious when the cause of action is not limited to
those suffering personal injury. In our hypothetical racist-speech law,272
the likely plaintiff is offended by racist speech. But a person who agrees
with the “all lives matter” message can sue, for the same goals or reasons
as SB8 plaintiffs—for the money or to enable a simpatico speaker to defend and litigate his First Amendment rights. The law cannot impose an
ideological or political litmus test as a condition for defining a right of
action or granting a right to sue.
Second, the legislature might require that any plaintiff show some injury caused by that abortion. But narrowing the cause of action undermines the legislative strategy of creating a wave of lawsuits to bankrupt
or drive out providers. Limiting the universe of potential plaintiffs limits
providers’ legal exposure by removing the threatened avalanche of hundreds of lawsuits by hundreds of random people. The narrower cause of
action resembles ordinary tort law273 or past attempts to target reproductive-health providers with medical malpractice and other civil litigation,
which did not achieve what anti-choice advocates hoped.274
Texas Solicitor General Stone compared an SB8 action to a tort of
“outrage,” where an individual becomes aware of a non-compliant abortion and it causes them moral or psychological harm.275 This establishes a
unique injury that might be ideologically limited—only an opponent of
reproductive freedom would suffer, and be able to plead and prove,
moral harm or psychological outrage because a random doctor performed
and a random person obtained a post-heartbeat abortion. But like the
environmental plaintiff, “any person” could support reproductive freedom generally but assert outrage at a specific abortion, satisfying that
added injury requirement
In any event, that point is moot. SB8 as drafted does not require a
plaintiff to plead and prove outrage or moral harm, does not compensate
for moral outrage, and does not distinguish an uninjured anti-choice
plaintiff from an uninjured pro-choice plaintiff. The legislature could narrow the cause of action in this way. But it has not done so.
B. DEFENDING

IN

FEDERAL COURT?

Challenging a state-law defensively does not necessarily mean proceeding in state court. Having been named in a private suit in state court,
defendants may remove to federal court if the federal district court would
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 175–76.
See supra Section III.C.4.a.
See supra Section III.C.4.b.
See ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 130, 173–74; Ziegler, supra note 39.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 47–49.
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have had jurisdiction and if the state plaintiff could have filed in federal
court.276 Although remaining in a defensive posture, they can litigate in a
potentially more favorable forum before a judge with Article III protections who has expertise in and solicitude for federal rights, while gaining a
faster path to Supreme Court review.
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction
A plaintiff can sue in, and a defendant can remove to, federal court
when the action arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.277 The central defense for advocates and providers in SB8
suits is that the fetal-heartbeat provision violates Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees of reproductive freedom.278
But the “well-pleaded complaint” rule requires the federal issue enter
the case as part of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; an anticipated
federal defense to a state claim is insufficient to establish jurisdiction or
to make the case removable.279 Although providers will raise SB8’s constitutional defects and its constitutional validity will determine the outcome,280 SB8 actions are state-law claims not within the district court’s
original federal-question jurisdiction.
SB8 demonstrates a major critique of the well-pleaded complaint
rule—it eliminates a species of case that, given the purposes of federalquestion jurisdiction, belong in federal district court. Federal-question jurisdiction ensures a judicial forum with the necessary expertise, respect,
and solicitude for federal law, rights, and interests. Federal judges, armed
with Article III structural protections of life tenure and guaranteed salary
and with a federal institutional orientation, better identify the appropriate level of enforcement of federal law and rights than state judges who
lack those protections and who are more oriented to the local community.281 If the goal is to provide an original judicial forum to vigorously
and competently respect and enforce federal rights, the procedural posture in which the federal issue presents does not matter; these underlying
policies are implicated as much when the federal issue arises as a defense
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
278. See Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 6.
279. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 106 (2d ed. 1990); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing
the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794–95 (1992); Wasserman, supra
note 146, at 908.
280. REDISH, supra note 279, at 105–08; Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for
It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 626–27, 656 (1987); Redish, supra
note 279, at 1796.
281. REDISH, supra note 279, at 83, 153, 346; Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1264 (2011); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1119–20, 1124–25 (1977); Wasserman, supra note 146, at 908–09.
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than as part of the claim.282
This reflects another way in which SB8 mirrors New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.283 Like the Times, providers face a coordinated campaign of
state-court litigation and massive judgments, intended to chill locally disfavored-but-constitutionally protected activity. Both have meritorious
and outcome-determinative federal constitutional defenses to liability,
and it is clear from the outset that they will raise those defenses. And the
well-pleaded complaint rule requires both to remain and defend in state
court.
The well-pleaded complaint rule reflects federal courts’ reluctance “to
insult state courts and state judges or to distrust their ability or willingness to understand and apply”284 the Constitution. But New York Times
reflected a time and place—the Jim Crow South—in which insults and
distrust were warranted.285 The nationwide wave of restrictive abortion
legislation286 of which SB8 is part suggests a similar time and place with
regard to the right to reproductive freedom. As the Times desired a federal forum to defend its First Amendment rights against this wave of lawsuits287 so do providers desire a federal forum committed to vindicating
the federal right to reproductive freedom. And as the Times’s First
Amendment defense was not sufficient to move the defamation actions
into federal court,288 neither is the providers’ Fourteenth Amendment defense sufficient to move SB8 actions into federal court.
2. Diversity Jurisdiction
A second basis for federal jurisdiction and possible removal is diversity
of citizenship, where the civil action is between citizens of different states
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.289 The first SB8 lawsuits
were filed against a Texas doctor by non-Texans: one from Arkansas requesting $100,000 and one from Illinois.290 A Texas provider might create
federal jurisdiction by coordinating with a friendly out-of-state plaintiff to
open diversity jurisdiction.
This strategy runs into several hurdles. The “forum-defendant rule”
precludes removal when one defendant is from the forum state.291 Be282.
283.
284.
285.

Wasserman, supra note 146, at 909.
See supra Section III.C.1.
Wasserman, supra note 146, at 909.
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451–52 (1985); Neuborne, supra note 281, at 1119 & n.55; Wasserman, supra note 146, at 910.
286. ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 205; Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1032–33,
1037–38.
287. Wasserman, supra note 146, at 909.
288. Id. at 908–09.
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
290. Supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
291. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005). Unless
Dr. Braid removed before being served. See § 1441(b)(2); Howard M. Wasserman, The
Forum-Defendant Rule, the Mischief Rule, and Snap Removal, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV.
ONLINE 51, 54 (2021).
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cause plaintiffs sued Braid, a Texan, in Texas state court, he cannot remove to a federal court in Texas after he was served. Providers might
overcome this problem if the friendly out-of-stater sues in federal court,
rather than beginning in state court with the defendant removing.
The diversity strategy becomes more difficult in a genuine adversarial
action by a reproductive-freedom opponent. Jurisdiction requires complete diversity, meaning no party is from the same state as an adverse
party.292 The paradigm SB8 suit pits an anti-choice Texas “any person”
against Texas doctors, nurses, and providers operating in the state. And if
a Texas “any person” targeted an out-of-state provider or advocate, he
could include one Texas defendant, which destroys complete diversity,
adds a forum defendant, and precludes removal.293
3. Lack of Standing
Unlike in New York Times, the well-pleaded complaint rule, lack of
complete diversity, and forum-defendant rule do not create the sole barriers to removal. SB8 actions face a second insurmountable hurdle to removal—lack of standing.
SB8 authorizes “any person” to bring a civil action.294 That person
need not have any connection to a particular post-heartbeat abortion or
to a particular woman who sought, considered, or obtained a post-heartbeat abortion. He need not have suffered any physical, monetary, or
other personal injury.295 It is enough that he wants to file suit and obtain
the available statutory relief.296
Such plaintiffs lack standing in federal district court.297 Even where a
legislature creates a cause of action and authorizes a person to sue, federal plaintiffs must show they suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning some
personal injury, tangible or intangible, analogous to recognized commonlaw injuries.298 A court lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim based on a mere
statutory violation, absent further personal harm.299 And ideological objections do not constitute sufficient injuries.300
SB8 actions recall the California litigation in Kasky v. Nike, Inc.301
State law authorized “any person acting for the interests of . . . the general public” to sue over consumer misinformation, regardless of whether
292. Lincoln Prop. Co., 546 U.S. at 84.
293. This offers another analogy to New York Times. While the Alabama plaintiff
targeted the New York-based Times, he added four non-diverse Alabama civil rights advocates as defendants to prevent removal and keep the case in Alabama state court. Papandrea, supra note 146, at 237–38; Wasserman, supra note 146, at 905–07.
294. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(a).
295. See id. § 171.208(a)–(b).
296. See id.
297. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203–04 (2021); Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S 330, 338–341 (2016).
298. See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203–04; Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339–41.
299. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.
300. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,
62 (1986).
301. 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
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the plaintiff was injured. This cause of action was as broad as the one in
SB8, although it retained public action as the primary enforcement mechanism supplemented by private action.302 The plaintiff, a politically active
consumer advocate, sued Nike in state court for false advertising based
on Nike press releases rebutting news reports about overseas factory
working conditions; Nike argued that these statements, if false, were protected by the First Amendment.303 The California Supreme Court reversed dismissal of the action, holding that Nike’s press releases were
commercial speech subject to less constitutional protection and regulable
under consumer-protection laws if false.304
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, then dismissed as improvidently granted, avoiding a significant First Amendment
ruling.305 Justice Stevens, concurring in the dismissal, and Justice Breyer,
dissenting from the dismissal, agreed that the plaintiff lacked Article III
standing to obtain original jurisdiction in federal court, by original filing
or removal, because he had not suffered any personal injury beyond the
statutory violation.306 Like Kasky, an “any person” SB8 plaintiff lacks
standing to file in federal court (not that someone ideologically opposed
to abortion would want to do so) and defendants cannot remove because
the action could not have originated in federal court.
The standing problem might resolve if federal courts must apply state
justiciability doctrines in diversity cases.307 Andrew Hessick argues a
state-law claim that can be brought in state court should be able to be
brought in federal court because federal courts provide an alternate forum for a permissible state claim.308 This point gains strength if SB8 were
amended to require outrage in line with a tort such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, which federal courts have long heard and resolved.309 Texas Solicitor General Stone proposed that some SB8
plaintiffs could have standing based on a state-law moral injury from that
person’s awareness of a prohibited abortion.310

302. Id. at 249 (alteration in original) (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West
2003) (amended 2004)); Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1081.
303. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247–48.
304. Id. at 260–63. See generally Collins & Skover, supra note 156, at 965.
305. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 654 (2003) (per curiam); Collins & Skover, supra
note 156, at 966.
306. Nike, 539 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 667–68 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
307. This cannot apply to federal-question cases, as SB8 actions cannot “arise under”
given the well-pleaded complaint rule. Supra Section IV.B.1.
308. F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 59
(2014) [hereinafter Hessick, Cases]; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 417, 418, 424 (2013) [hereinafter Hessick, Standing].
309. Gerber v. Herskovitz, 14 F.4th 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2021); Hessick, Standing, supra
note 308, at 425.
310. Supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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STATE COURT

Absent rare circumstances, SB8 actions will be filed and litigated in
state court and providers will assert their constitutional rights in a defensive posture there. But that posture does not prevent providers from litigating and vindicating constitutional rights. Even on defense in state
court, they have state and federal defenses available to defeat claims, despite SB8’s intent to disadvantage them in state-court proceedings.311
1. Standing in State Court
Providers want to focus on the federal constitutional defects in SB8’s
core ban on post-heartbeat abortions; their litigation goal is a judicial
declaration that SB8 is invalid as much as avoiding liability in that action
(especially actions by friendly plaintiffs).
But a dispositive state-law defense looms in the individual case and as
to the overall viability of SB8’s enforcement scheme—whether the statutorily authorized “any person” who has suffered no injury and bears no
personal connection or interest to any abortion has standing under Texas
law. This is an essential piece of the procedural and jurisdictional puzzle.
Texas lawmakers targeted providers with the cost, burden, and expense of
defending a tidal wave of lawsuits and liability from random individuals
throughout Texas state courts. If Texas standing law prohibits the legislature from authorizing random and attenuated lawsuits, that effort
collapses.
a. Texas Standing
Texas, like every state, has unique standing principles applicable to its
courts.312 These rules may be different and more forgiving than Article
III’s rigid “case or controversy” requirement.313 While Texas purports to
mostly follow federal standing jurisprudence and principles,314 nothing in
Article III or federal due process demands that it do so.
In Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, the Texas Supreme Court grounded state standing doctrines in two provisions of the
Texas Constitution.315 An express separation of powers provision,316 parallel to the unenumerated structural principles of the U.S. Constitution,
precludes the judiciary from exercising governmental authority vested in
311. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 546 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); supra Section II.A.
312. See RHODES, supra note 234; Thomas B. Bennett, State Rejection of Federal Law,
97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 30–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3915553 [https://perma.cc/A2ZY-VNSS]; Hessick, Standing, supra note 308, at 425; Hessick, Cases, supra note 308, at 65–66.
313. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); Hessick, Cases, supra note 308, at 66–67.
314. See, e.g., Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021);
Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 776 (Tex. 2020).
315. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–45 (Tex. 1993)
(first citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; and then citing id. art. I, § 13).
316. TEX. CONST. art. II § 1.
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other government departments.317 This provision supports the state judiciary’s longstanding refusal to issue advisory opinions, a power vested in
the executive branch.318 An express open-courts provision guarantees
that “every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”319 Texas Ass’n of
Business found a personal-injury requirement “implicit” in this provision’s guarantee of a remedy for those injured.320
Since Texas Ass’n of Business, the court has borrowed familiar standing
principles from federal decisions.321 It adopted the Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife three-prong requirement of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability for most state standing questions, tracing those limits to the twin
state constitutional principles of separation of powers and open courts.322
Texas Solicitor General Stone emphasized the identity between federal
and Texas justiciability principles.323
The reality of Texas standing law is more complicated and less certain.
Pre-Texas Ass’n of Business precedent departed federal principles and
has not been pulled back into the federal line in some areas.324 Texas
grants standing to political subdivisions,325 to taxpayers,326 and to plaintiffs under certain statutes.327 The legislature may confer standing on individuals lacking a particularized individual injury that differentiates
them from the public at large. “Within constitutional bounds, the Legislature may grant a right to a citizen or to a taxpayer to bring an action
against a public body or a right of review on behalf of the public without
proof of particular or pecuniary damage peculiar to the person bringing
the suit.”328
For example, an early 20th-century statute authorized “any citizen” to
bring an action to enjoin operation of a “bawdy or disorderly house,”
without requiring the citizen “to show that he is personally injured by the
actions complained of”; the court allowed private litigants to pursue private actions for injunctive relief without showing specific damage to their
317. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444.
318. Id.
319. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
320. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444.
321. See Bennett, supra note 312, at 32–35.
322. See, e.g., In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020); Garcia v. City of Willis, 593
S.W.3d 201, 206–07 (Tex. 2019); Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484–85
(Tex. 2018); Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 147, 154–56 (Tex. 2012); City
of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 145 (Tex. 2011); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of
Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004).
323. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of Justice Alito); id.
at 47–48.
324. RHODES, supra note 234, at 115.
325. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583–84 (Tex.
2003).
326. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001).
327. Cf. Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2011).
328. Scott v. Bd. of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966).
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person or property caused by the bawdy house.329 The state attorney general and local prosecutors retained power to enforce the law, applying the
same dual-enforcement mechanism to bawdy houses that California applied to false advertising.330
Fifty years later, the court upheld standing under a statute authorizing
“any taxpayer” to challenge the legality of a zoning board decision, such
as granting a variance allowing the erection of a large sign.331 The authorization of suit by “any taxpayer” (as opposed to anyone “aggrieved”)
meant plaintiffs need not prove that the zoning decision diminished the
value of their property.332
The Texas Supreme Court has not issued a holding on statutory standing since Texas Ass’n of Business. But its dicta implies that statutory
standing works an exception to ordinary standing rules requiring a particularized injury.333 Texas appellate courts have followed that dicta and
permitted legislatively conferred standing, such as “[a]ny property tax
paying citizen” suing to enjoin a contract awarded in violation of the
County Purchasing Act334 or “[a] citizen” bringing an action to enjoin a
violation of the Antiquities Code.335
Independent statutory standing in Texas renders standing more plausible in an SB8 action brought in state court. And it makes the analysis
more complicated than parroting Lujan and other federal standing law, as
in the Whole Woman’s Health argument.
b. State Standing and SB8
Despite Texas’s broader rules, “any person” plaintiffs should not have
standing to bring SB8 actions in state court, as the state Multi-District
Litigation judge concluded.336 Again, however, state law dictates this conclusion, not the federal Constitution, Article III, or due process.
329. Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 602–03 (Tex. 1915). A “bawdy house” was kept
for prostitution, while a “disorderly house” sold liquor and employed “lewd” women or
prostitutes. Id. at 602.
330. See supra Section III.C.4.a.
331. Scott, 405 S.W.2d at 55–57.
332. Id. at 57.
333. E.g., Jefferson County v. Jefferson Cnty. Constables Ass’n, 546 S.W.3d 661, 666
(Tex. 2018); Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Tex. 2015); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d
171, 178 (Tex. 2001).
334. Labrado v. County of El Paso, 132 S.W.3d 581, 587 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no
pet.) (alteration in original).
335. Grossman v. Wolfe, 578 S.W.3d 250, 256–57 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet.
denied).
336. Order Declaring Certain Civil Procedures Unconstitutional and Issuing Declaratory Judgment at 46, Van Stean v. Tex. Right to Life, No. D-1-GN-21-004179 (98th Dist.
Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/
2021/12/Van-Stean-Filemarked-Order-Declaring-Certain-Civil-Procedures-Unconstitutional.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6E4-7ZU3]. We agree with the conclusion about lack of
standing under SB8, although we question the court doing so in an offensive pre-enforcement posture, rather than waiting for an SB8 action and analyzing standing then.
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i. The Checking Function of Private Litigation
Prior Texas cases authorized citizens or taxpayers to sue to check government officials. Private suits ensured compliance with laws cabining
government authority. Or private citizens acted where government failed
or refused to act. The statute allowing private suits against the proprietors
of bawdy houses began from the premise that elected officials failed to
enforce the law against such places of ill repute, whether because of bribery or because officials were partaking in the services provided.
SB8 “any person” plaintiffs do not check government failure. They pursue a monetary bounty to act as the government and in the government’s
stead in enforcing the law.337 No government failure or refusal created an
enforcement gap—Texas’s executive branch willingly and happily enforces abortions restrictions.338 The state turned to exclusive private enforcement to make it more difficult for providers to challenge the
constitutional validity of the heartbeat ban in an offensive posture, recognizing it would have been declared invalid and public enforcement enjoined under prevailing jurisprudence.339 This represents a new species of
private state statutory standing, beyond anything Texas courts have
allowed.
ii. Exclusivity of Enforcement
Prior grants of statutory private standing did not bar public enforcement or prohibit executive departments from pursuing their constitutional responsibilities.
The Supreme Court grounds federal standing limitations in the scope
of executive power. Private enforcement of environmental laws, even to
supplement public enforcement, interferes with the President’s essential
constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”340
But the Texas Constitution divides the executive power among state and
local officials, none subject to unilateral removal by the governor.341 A
supplemental private mechanism for checking abuse or failure by independent public officials is consistent with that divided system because the
state executive department, however authority is distributed, continues
the executive function of causing the laws to be faithfully executed.342
Delegating enforcement power responsibility—exclusively and unchecked—to random individuals defies that executive power. It also aggrandizes the judicial power by authorizing claims by plaintiffs with no
337. See Van Stean, No. D-1-GN-21-004179, slip op. at 31–34.
338. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016);
Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F.4th 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2021); Whole Woman’s
Health v. Smith, 338 F. Supp. 3d 606, 615–617 (W.D. Tex. 2018); Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 222 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
339. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1038, 1059–60.
340. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3).
341. See RHODES, supra note 234, at 563–68, 593.
342. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. art. IV, § 10.
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justiciable interest. And it is boundless, allowing the legislature to follow
this approach with numerous laws, eliminating state and local executive
officials’ constitutionally mandated enforcement power.
iii. Non-Texan Enforcement of Texas Law
SB8 delegates enforcement power to non-Texans—“any person” can
come from anywhere, as demonstrated by the first lawsuits.343 But a nonTexan cannot perform a checking function on Texas officials. SB8 abdicates sovereign power to strangers, those without connection to Texas
and with no interest in proper Texas governance or enforcement of Texas
law, beyond a generalized desire for a bounty or an ideological objection
(not required to sue) to abortion.
iv. Implied Injury
Texas’ open-courts provision implies an injury requirement.344 Plaintiffs in prior statutory-standing cases suffered an actual (if generalized
rather than particularized) potential financial or property harm—from
the public nuisance of a neighborhood bawdy house,345 from a sign obstruction,346 or from an unlawful expenditure of county funds—that injunctive relief redressed.347 One appellate court recognized this point:
“When the Legislature confers citizen standing, it waives the requirement
that an injury be particularized, that is, distinct from the injury to the
general public, but the Legislature does not waive the requirement that
the plaintiff suffer any injury at all.”348 SB8 plaintiffs, whether opponents
or supporters of reproductive rights, fall in the latter category of those
who do not “suffer any injury at all.”349 “Any person” suffers nothing
resembling a financial, physical, or property harm from a provider performing a post-heartbeat abortion on a random patient.
The statutory prohibition on multiple recoveries for one prohibited
abortion demonstrates the absence of personal connection or injury between a statutory violation and any plaintiff.350 That is why Plaintiff A
gets no remedy if Plaintiff B has recovered for that abortion—Plaintiff A
needs no remedy because Plaintiff A suffered no injury.351 The remedy
belongs to the state, with not even a shared injury to either individual.
This is not sufficient under the state open-courts provision as interpreted
in Texas Ass’n of Business.352
343. See Chen, supra note 82.
344. Supra notes 319–23 and accompanying text.
345. See Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 599–600 (Tex. 1915).
346. See Scott v. Bd. of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 55–56 (Tex. 1966).
347. See Labrado v. County of El Paso, 132 S.W.3d 581, 587 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004,
no pet.).
348. Denucci ex rel. Best Buy Stores, Inc. v. Hegar, No. 03-19-00246-CV, 2021 WL
1432313, at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin April 16, 2021, no pet.).
349. See id.
350. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.208(c).
351. See id.
352. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 448–50 (Tex. 1993).
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If SB8 plaintiffs lack standing even under Texas’s broader approach,
providers face a strategic choice. They want a court to declare the constitutional invalidity of the fetal-heartbeat ban as a matter of federal law
and they want the courts, especially the Supreme Court of the United
States, to do so as quickly as possible. They might be tempted to avoid
state and jurisdictional issues in favor of focusing and resolving the federal constitutional merits. But the court may not allow that because
standing is a preliminary jurisdictional issue that cannot be skipped.353
And providers may choose not to skip the issue. If the state constitution
prohibits the legislature from delegating enforcement authority to noninjured, disconnected individuals, SB8’s basic framework and strategy
fail. That defeats all SB8 lawsuits and deters future state efforts to enact
copycat laws.
2. Defending in State Court
Offensive litigation offers rights holders the twin benefits of interim
relief through an order prohibiting enforcement pending litigation and
speedy resolution through immediate review of the grant or denial of the
request for interim relief.354 Defensive litigation does not offer interim
relief—because the defending rights holder does not seek a remedy
(other than defeating and dismissing the enforcement action), there is no
interim relief to provide.355 Nevertheless, Texas procedure allows for expeditious litigation and resolution of federal and state constitutional defenses in SB8 actions, without placing a judgment burden on providers.
While not as procedurally favorable as offensive litigation, litigating defensively in state court is not impossible (and certainly not a distinct constitutional problem),356 as state procedure enables providers to minimize
the costs and burdens of vindicating their rights in court.
a. Motion to Dismiss
Providers can and will move to dismiss the SB8 petition as having no
basis in law under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the
state equivalent to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).357 A cause
of action is legally baseless “if the allegations, taken as true, together with
inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the
relief sought.”358 The constitutional invalidity of the law being enforced
provides a proper basis for a Rule 91a motion, raising a pure question of
law requiring no evidence.359 The motion must be filed and the trial court
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

See id. at 443–45.
Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1052–54.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.C.
See 2 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. GRAFTON CARLSON, MCDONALD &
CARLSON TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 9:27.10 (2d ed. 2020).
358. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1.
359. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6.
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must rule quickly; providers have sixty days after service to file the motion, which must be granted or denied within forty-five days of filing.360 A
quick motion and quick decision yield quick resolution in the trial court.
Given the heartbeat ban’s clear contradiction of Roe and Casey, a state
trial judge adhering to her judicial oath and obligation to follow Supreme
Court precedent must grant this motion and dismiss the case. Of course,
Texas lawmakers designed SB8 to push cases into state court with the
hope (and perhaps expectation) that judges will not adhere to their oath
and to binding precedent.
b. Appellate Review of the Motion to Dismiss
i. Granting Dismissal
If the trial court dismisses on either state standing361 or federal constitutional grounds, the SB8 plaintiff can appeal the final judgment to the
appropriate state court of appeals. The losing party in that court can petition the Texas Supreme Court for discretionary review;362 the loser in the
Texas Supreme Court can seek review in the Supreme Court of the
United States.363
A trial-court dismissal reveals SB8’s perverse incentive structures. Recall that anti-choice activists and organizations chose not to sue in SB8’s
first weeks, allowing the threat of suit and liability to chill providers unwilling to risk an adverse judgment, without giving them an opportunity
to litigate SB8’s constitutional validity.364 Having sued and lost in the trial
court, “any person” may choose not to appeal the judgment, accepting
the loss but depriving providers of binding precedent on the constitutional issue from the Texas Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of the
United States. And that loss may be one suit in a broader campaign. That
“any person” may file a new lawsuit against the same or different provider over a different post-heartbeat abortion or watch a different “any
person” file a new lawsuit against that provider over the same abortion.
Friendly plaintiffs again solve this problem.365 As they have the incentive to sue and to create litigation, they have the incentive to pursue appellate review. If the friendly plaintiff wants to help providers establish
SB8’s constitutional invalidity, they will pursue that litigation to higher
courts and to binding precedent on the constitutional issues, even if the
result is “adverse” to the position the friendly plaintiff urges in litigation.
ii. Denying Dismissal
A trial-court denial of the motion to dismiss complicates matters for
providers. Denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final and appealable
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3.
Supra Section IV.C.1.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.A.4.
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order.366 Providers must continue in the trial court, prolonging the process and delaying resolution of the central constitutional question.367
Texas law provides two mechanisms for immediate review of the denial of
the motion to dismiss.
One is a writ of mandamus, which is more available under Texas practice than federal practice.368 Mandamus is proper if the trial court clearly
fails to properly apply the law and the benefits of mandamus review outweigh the costs, considering the facts and public policy.369 Given SB8’s
blatant contradiction of Roe and Casey, a decision denying dismissal and
refusing to declare the fetal-heartbeat ban constitutionally invalid constitutes a clear failure to properly apply the law. Public policy favors immediate review of the denial,370 given the potential for numerous identical
SB8 suits and the serious constitutional issues involved.
A second option, more complex and time-consuming, is a permissive
interlocutory appeal on a “controlling question of law” subject to a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” when “an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance” the suit’s resolution.371 A declaration that the fetal heartbeat prohibition is valid satisfies that standard—
SB8’s constitutional validity is a pure question of controlling law that has
not been judicially resolved, and reversal means the prohibition is invalid
and the SB8 action must be dismissed. Interlocutory review is discretionary; the trial court and court of appeals must agree that the order is worthy of immediate review.372
After the court of appeals asserts jurisdiction via either mandamus or
interlocutory review and decides the substantive issues, the Texas Supreme Court can review that decision and establish binding precedent for
Texas courts.373 The Supreme Court of the United States can review the
state supreme court decision.374
Texas procedure’s greater receptivity to nonfinal appellate review minimizes the objection and concern that defensive litigation is slower than
offensive.375 A quick denial of the motion to dismiss plus broad interlocutory review of an (obviously incorrect) decision allowing the action to
366. City of Beaumont v. Guillory, 751 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1988); N.E. Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 51.011–.016.
367. Offensive litigation can be speedier than defensive litigation because the rights
holder seeks preliminary injunctive relief and the grant or denial of preliminary relief is
immediately appealable as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Wasserman & Rhodes, supra
note 27, at 1053–54.
368. See 6 MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 357, § 35:1; Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Demystifying the Extraordinary Writ: Substantive and Procedural Requirements
for the Issuance of Mandamus, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 525, 528–30 (1998).
369. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004).
370. Cf. In re Essex Ins. Co., 459 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014).
371. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d).
372. TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a).
373. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3.
374. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
375. See Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1051–54.
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continue could allow an SB8 case to move through the courts as quickly
as an offensive case. On the other hand, the discretionary nature of these
doctrines and the political controversy surrounding SB8 incentivize
courts to slow-walk these cases.
c. Abatement of Multiple Suits
Providers worry about the risk of multiple simultaneous suits by multiple non-friendly plaintiffs across the state. Although one plaintiff can recover for one post-heartbeat abortion,376 multiple plaintiffs can force a
provider to defend multiple suits over that abortion. And if providers
continue business as usual by performing all abortions, multiple plaintiffs
may target multiple abortions.377 Obtaining dismissal and appellate review of one lawsuit over one abortion does not relieve providers of the
cost and burden of litigating a campaign of lawsuits.
Texas offers a solution in the plea in abatement,378 in which a court
may abate one action in deference to another ongoing action, considering
the practicalities and “the interrelation[ship] of the subject matter of the
two suits.”379 Abatement is not mandatory when suits do not involve the
same parties.380 And appellate review of denial of abatement is under an
abuse of discretion standard.381
Abatement of subsequent suits offers an appropriate response to an
avalanche of SB8 lawsuits. Every suit raises the legal question of SB8’s
constitutional validity and the precedent established in the first action
resolves or helps resolve others. That every SB8 plaintiff litigates public
rather than personal interests strengthens the argument for abatement.
Abating B’s lawsuit in deference to A’s lawsuit does not deprive B of the
opportunity to litigate and vindicate distinct personal rights, as B and A
act on behalf of the same public. This process lowers costs and allows
providers to focus on litigating and prevailing in one case against one
enforcer, as they might in offensive litigation.
d. Suspension of Judgments
A final monetary judgment against a provider appears unlikely. The
trial court will grant or deny the motion to dismiss and either decision
should be immediately appealed,382 if the losing “any person” does not
give up. But providers may fear having to litigate to a final judgment in
the trial court and incurring substantive judgments as a condition of seeking review. Following the trial in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and as
the case wound through the Alabama Supreme Court and to the Supreme
376. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(c).
377. See id. § 171.208(b)(2).
378. See 2 MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 357, at § 9:20.
379. Dolenz v. Cont’l Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1981) (quoting Timon v. Dolan, 244 S.W.2d 985, 987 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ)).
380. See id.
381. Id.
382. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 302–04 (Cal. 2002).
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Court of the United States, Sullivan sought to collect on the judgment
from the four individual defendants; the state seized and auctioned their
automobiles and real estate to satisfy the judgment, driving one defendant from Alabama for a ministry in Ohio.383
Providers facing adverse judgments can suspend enforcement of the
judgment pending a final “adverse judgment . . . on appeal.”384 This eases
the financial threat of defensive litigation, as providers need not pay damages or may not have to comply with an injunction until they have exhausted all appeals.
This process is not costless, however. Providers must file a supersedeas
bond, post a cash deposit, obtain an order of alternate security from the
court, or enter into a private supersedeas agreement negotiated by the
parties.385 The bond or cash deposit must be in the amount of compensatory damages, costs, and anticipated interest during the course of the appeal, not exceeding the lesser of $25 million or half the current net worth
of the judgment debtor.386 The trial court may suspend injunctive relief
pending appeal, with the defendant filing security to cover a loss or damage to the plaintiff caused by the delay on appeal.387 If the Texas Supreme Court affirms a judgment against providers, it can stay issuance of
the mandate pending a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, if the state court determines “that the grounds [for review]
are substantial,” and that “serious hardship” would result if the mandate
issued and the Supreme Court later reversed the judgment.388
3. Raising Defenses in State Court
Channeled into a defensive posture, providers assert SB8’s constitutional defects as defenses to liability—a basis for the court to dismiss the
enforcement suit or otherwise enter judgment in their favor, denying SB8
plaintiffs their sought remedies and protecting providers from liability.
SB8 purports to limit the defenses available to rights holders in state
litigation.389 Providers cannot assert patients’ reproductive rights unless
they can show third-party standing.390 This bars providers from raising
the primary defense that the substantive ban on post-heartbeat abortion—prohibiting a large swath of pre-viability abortions—violates pregnant people’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in
Roe and Casey. Providers cannot avoid liability because the post-heart383. LEWIS, supra note 145, at 162; supra text accompanying note 148.
384. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1.
385. See id. 24.1(a).
386. Id. 24.2(a)(1). The trial court must also lower the required security to an amount
that will not cause the judgment debtor “substantial economic harm” upon a finding that
the full amount would cause such harm. Id. 24.2(b).
387. See id. 24.2(a)(3). These trial court orders on suspending judgments are then subject to appellate review in the court of appeals and by mandamus from the state supreme
court. See In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 567–68 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
388. TEX. R. APP. P. 18.2.
389. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.208(e).
390. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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beat abortion was lawful at the time of performance under existing judicial precedent or court order.391 If the Court overrules Roe and Casey,
“any person” can sue and recover over an abortion performed before
precedent changed. This creates practical retroactivity—a provider may
be liable for conduct that at the time could not provide a basis for
liability.392
Whether these limitations are constitutionally valid and whether they
stymie providers and advocates in defending these suits is beyond the
scope of this paper. For our purposes, it is enough that constitutional defects in state procedures can be raised and adjudicated in the defensive
proceedings, with state resolution providing a federal issue for Supreme
Court review.393 To the extent the limitations on defenses are constitutionally invalid, state judges must disregard them in SB8 litigation and
allow rights holders to raise all defenses they are constitutionally entitled
to pursue, just as state judges must disregard an invalid substantive claimproviding law.
4. Review in the Supreme Court of the United States
Pushing providers onto defense in state court does not thwart federal
judicial review of the constitutional validity of the heartbeat ban and any
limits on defenses. Defensive litigation delays the federal forum to the
end of the process and shifts it to appellate rather than original jurisdiction, via review and reversal by the Supreme Court of the United
States.394 But providers may not find this option satisfactory.
a. Time and Risk
Providers remain on the defensive, waiting for a random plaintiff to
initiate a lawsuit at a random moment and perhaps in a far-flung Texas
county. Meanwhile, they are chilled in the exercise of constitutionally
protected conduct or must risk violating state law and subjecting themselves to liability as a condition of vindicating their constitutional rights.
All to the detriment of patients seeking reproductive-health services.
And the federal forum comes at the end of expensive and time-consuming defensive litigation through the three-tiered state judiciary, imposing
the costs, burdens, and expenses of a longer state-court litigation process.
b. Discretionary Review
The federal forum is not guaranteed because all Supreme Court review
is by certiorari; the Court will take the case if the Justices want to hear
391. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
392. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383,
411–19 (2018).
393. See, e.g., Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1252 (2017); Phila. Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986).
394. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
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it.395 Prior to 1988, the Court exercised appellate (mandatory) jurisdiction over state-court judgments declaring state law valid in the face of a
federal constitutional challenge.396 The legislatively desired outcome of
an SB8 suit is that the Texas courts reject providers’ Fourteenth Amendment defenses and find the statute constitutionally valid.
Such a case would have required Supreme Court review, making SB8
challenges a casualty of the Court’s shift to an all-discretionary docket.
Critics argue that change transformed the Court from a judicial body to a
super-legislature, controlling its agenda and seeking out and deciding
“controversial questions” at a macro level rather than resolving cases at a
micro level.397 The Court’s docket has shrunk for the past three decades,
with October Term 2019 featuring the fewest argued cases since the Civil
War.398 State-court cases declined as part of the docket following the shift
to all-discretionary review,399 suggesting Congress and the Court succeeded in withdrawing these cases from the docket.400 The combination
of all-discretionary review and the shrinking docket explains providers’
imperative for offensive litigation in federal court;401 with no guarantee
of Supreme Court review, defensive state-court litigation does not ensure
review by an Article III court.
Although discretionary, review seems likely in any SB8 case. A statecourt judgment declaring valid a ban on pre-viability abortions conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent in Roe and Casey, a common basis for
Supreme Court review.402 Although not obligated, the Court often exercises its discretion to hear cases challenging the constitutional validity of
state law, regardless of whether the state court accepted or rejected the
federal arguments.403
SB8’s procedural uniqueness might attract the Court’s attention, returning to the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan analogue.404 New York
Times fit the Warren Court’s larger jurisprudential project of expanding
395. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Wasserman, supra note 146, at 912.
396. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982) (amended 1988); Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman,
The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 95–96 (1988);
Hellman, National Law, supra note 140, at 409.
397. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1716–18, 1733–34 (2000); Boskey &
Gressman, supra note 396, at 95–96; Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 599–600 (2010).
398. Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Something We Haven’t Seen in the Supreme
Court Since the Civil War, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/empirical-scotus-something-we-havent-seen-in-the-supremecourt-since-the-civil-war [https://perma.cc/4SUU-8FTJ].
399. Hellman, National Law, supra note 140, at 411 & tbl.1; Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, What Conservative Constitutional Revolution? Moderating Five Degrees of Judicial
Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts Court, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 48–51 (2011).
400. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 396, at 96; Hartnett, supra note 397, at 1732.
401. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1057; supra notes 397–400 and accompanying text.
402. SUP. CT. R. 10(c).
403. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1243–44, 1260–61 (1978).
404. Supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment liberties in disputes touching race and civil rights during a volatile historical period.405 And the case involved dubious harm to
a random plaintiff from an innocuous publication that did not warrant a
half-million-dollar judgment.406 The current Court does not share a jurisprudential project of expanding constitutional rights to reproductive freedom—quite the opposite, as the Court may be receptive to new
limitations on abortion, if not to overruling Roe and Casey.407 But everyone recognizes SB8’s unusual structure and its obvious constitutional invalidity under current precedent.408 Assuming the Court does not
overrule Roe and Casey in Dobbs, it is difficult to believe the Justices
would not address SB8’s constitutional validity when presented with a
procedurally appropriate vehicle at the appropriate time—one originating in Texas court, litigated defensively, and coming from Texas’s highest
court.
c. Finality
The Court reviews “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.”409 This requires
litigants to exhaust the state judiciary before getting to federal court. The
availability of the federal forum thus may depend on how Texas courts
resolve the constitutional issues and when. It also may depend on how
much Texas judges and the Justices wish to expedite this unusual case.
The simplest case is the most appropriate outcome under Roe and
Casey. The state court dismisses the SB8 action; the losing “any person”
appeals to the state court of appeals and state supreme court; and the
state supreme court’s decision affirming the lower courts is final.410 Further litigation depends on the basis for the court’s decision. If the Texas
Supreme Court decides the plaintiff lacks standing under state law, the
case ends, as the state supreme court has the final word on state law.411 If
the Texas Supreme Court resolves the federal issues by declaring SB8
constitutionally invalid, the Supreme Court of the United States could
review this final judgment as to federal law, although some argue that the
Court’s resources are not well spent on reviewing cases in which a state
supreme court adopts an expansive view of the federal Constitution and
405. Blasi, supra note 285, at 482; Kalven, supra note 146, at 192; Logan, supra note
206, at 763–64; McGowan, supra note 206, at 513–14; Neuborne, supra note 204, at 79;
Wasserman, supra note 146, at 836–37.
406. Wasserman, supra note 146, at 912; see also Papandrea, supra note 146, at 234–37;
Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 105–06.
407. ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 205–06; Wasserman, supra note 291, at 59; see also
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (granting certiorari in part);
Dobbs Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 9–11.
408. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2494 (2021) (per
curiam).
409. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
410. See supra notes 361–62 and accompanying text.
411. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–42 (1983).
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declares state law invalid.412
The case becomes complicated if the Texas Supreme Court declares
SB8 constitutionally valid and allows the SB8 action to proceed. The litigation is not complete if further trial-court proceedings remain on the
merits of the SB8 claim.
The Court takes a “practical” approach to § 1257 finality, recognizing
several categories of cases in which the Court treats a judgment of a
state’s highest court as final when the federal issues (the only thing the
Court can address) are final and reviewable, even if further state-court
litigation on state issues remains.413 Two categories might apply to render
final and appealable a state-court decision declaring SB8 valid.
The first covers cases in which the state court renders a conclusive
judgment on the federal issue and the outcome of further proceedings is
preordained, as where the party seeking review has no defense other than
his federal rights and cannot prevail at trial on the facts or on any
nonfederal grounds.414 Further state proceedings “result in a completely
unnecessary waste of time,” delaying inevitable review.415 A typical SB8
action fits this category if the provider admits performing the challenged
post-heartbeat abortion,416 as Dr. Braid did in announcing his actions in a
national newspaper.417 He cannot deny having performed a statutorily
prohibited abortion; his only defense is that he cannot be liable under a
law that is invalid under the federal Constitution, a defense the state supreme court has rejected. His liability on the state claim is preordained;
further proceedings waste time and delay inevitable, dispositive federal
review.
The Court established the second, more controversial418 category in
Cox. A sexual-assault victim’s father brought state-court statutory and
common law privacy claims against a news station for publishing the victim’s name.419 The Georgia Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting
outlets from publishing such information did not violate the First Amendment and that a common law tort claim could proceed on remand.420
Although further state-court proceedings remained, the Supreme
Court treated the state supreme court judgment as final and review412. See Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 127 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Long, 463
U.S. at 1067–68 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sager, supra note 403, at 1243–44, 1260–61.
413. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477–78 & n.7 (1975).
414. Id. at 479 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)); REDISH, supra note 279,
at 254–55.
415. Cox, 420 U.S. at 479.
416. Cf. Mills, 384 U.S. at 215–16. In Mills, the newspaper editor conceded that he
wrote and published an election-day endorsement in violation of state law. Id. at 217. Thus,
although the Alabama Supreme Court “remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings,” the decision was “final” because the trial court had no choice but to convict
Mills for “wr[iting] and publish[ing] the editorial.” Id.
417. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
418. REDISH, supra note 279, at 256–57.
419. Cox, 420 U.S. at 473–74.
420. Id. at 474–75.
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able.421 The state court had finally decided the federal issue of the state
statute’s constitutional validity and allowed claims based on publication
of the name to proceed.422 Further state-court proceedings would cover
nonfederal issues.423 The party seeking review (the broadcaster in Cox)
“might prevail on . . . nonfederal grounds, rendering unnecessary review
of the federal issue,” while immediate reversal on the federal issue precludes further state proceedings.424 And failing to immediately review the
state-court decision might “seriously erode federal policy,” by leaving in
place binding (within the state) precedent on the federal issue that might
chill other speakers.425
Cox renders final and appealable a Texas Supreme Court judgment declaring SB8 valid and allowing the action to continue. The court’s determination that SB8 is constitutionally valid is final. Providers and
advocates could prevail on state-law grounds in state court (such as by
showing that no heartbeat had been detected or that a medical emergency existed), depriving the Supreme Court of the opportunity to review
the federal constitutional question. Immediate reversal of the state court
on the federal issue and immediate declaration that the fetal-heartbeat
ban is constitutionally invalid ends the litigation. And allowing, even temporarily, a binding-in-Texas opinion declaring valid a prohibition on abortions at six weeks of pregnancy seriously erodes the federal constitutional
rights of women in Texas and the interests of providers who serve them,
who operate in the shadow of a statute whose validity is in serious doubt.
d. Standing in the Supreme Court
A potential standing problem looms for Supreme Court review. If an
SB8 plaintiff lacks standing to bring the lawsuit in an Article III court,426
how can an Article III court review the judgment in that lawsuit. That is,
if the case could not have originated in a federal district court, the state
judgment should not be reviewable by any federal court. In ASARCO v.
Kadish, the Court stated:
When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in
the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and
concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review, where the
requisites of a case or controversy are also met.427
In other words, the state-court loser, harmed by an adverse state-court
judgment, has standing to obtain Supreme Court review of that judgment
and the underlying federal issues. Given the state’s hoped-for course of
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id. at 485.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482–83.
Id. at 483, 485–86; REDISH, supra note 279, at 257.
See supra Section IV.B.3.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989).
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SB8 litigation—a plaintiff without Article III standing sues and prevails
in the Texas courts—ASARCO gives providers Article III standing to
seek review of the state-court judgment.
But ASARCO may not eliminate all standing problems if providers
lose on the federal constitutional question in the Texas courts and jurisdiction depends on the fourth Cox category. Such a case repeats the procedural muddle of Nike v. Kasky.428
The California Supreme Court reversed dismissal, holding that Nike’s
press releases were commercial speech, did not enjoy complete First
Amendment protection if false,429 and could form the basis for civil liability. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, then dismissed as improvidently granted.430
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred in the dismissal,431 while Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and O’Connor dissented.432 Justice Breyer argued
that Nike had standing under a synthesis of ASARCO and the fourth Cox
category433—Nike was injured by a state judgment and that judgment
had practical finality under Cox. Stevens rejected this synthesis as improperly expanding ASARCO. He argued that ASARCO creates standing in the Supreme Court because an adverse final state-court judgment
works a “direct, specific, and concrete injury,” by “altering tangible legal
rights.”434 But the denial of the motion to dismiss in Kasky did not alter
tangible rights or cause a direct, specific, and concrete injury; it required
Nike to litigate further to vindicate those rights, but without finality and
thus without an injury to establish Article III standing.435
Their points of departure illustrate a potential problem for reviewing
SB8 cases in which the Texas Supreme Court determines that the Fourteenth Amendment does not bar the lawsuit and allows the state-law
claims to continue. That produces the same interaction of ASARCO and
Cox—an SB8 action that could not be litigated in federal court has not
caused defendant providers a “direct, specific, and concrete injury” beyond having to litigate state-law issues in state court. This might prompt
the Court to deny certiorari, requiring providers to litigate to a final judgment in state court and reach the Supreme Court on the constitutional
claims after complete state-court litigation down the line. That renders
defensive litigation longer, more burdensome, and more costly compared
with the offensive litigation SB8 precludes,436 to the detriment of reproductive freedom in Texas.
428. Supra notes 154–68 and accompanying text.
429. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002).
430. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam).
431. See id. at 656–65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
432. See id. at 665–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
433. See id. at 669–70.
434. Id. at 662 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,
619, 623–24 (1989)).
435. Id. at 662–63, 662 & n.4.
436. See supra Section IV.C.4.
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Constitutional remedies—issued through offensive or defensive litigation—are limited to the parties, contrary to common perception. Courts
do not “strike down” or “block” invalid laws; courts stop their present
and future enforcement.437 And offensive litigation enjoins future enforcement not against all rights holders who might be subject to the law,
but against the parties to the offensive litigation—defendant officials cannot enforce the challenged law against the parties to the case, but remain
free to enforce that law or a similar law against non-parties.438
This is obvious in defensive litigation. Imagine A sues Planned
Parenthood under SB8; Planned Parenthood defends on the grounds that
the law is inconsistent with the Constitution; and the court agrees with
Planned Parenthood that the law is constitutionally invalid and cannot be
enforced as the rule of decision or provide a basis for liability. The court
dismisses A’s lawsuit but does nothing more.
The opinion supporting the judgment functions as precedent that influences or dictates the outcome of future cases.439 But judicial precedent
cannot prohibit another plaintiff from initiating a future SB8 enforcement
action and attempting to litigate anew; it guarantees he loses when the
new court adheres to that precedent and applies it to the new case.440 If a
court has declared SB8 invalid in A v. Planned Parenthood, other actions
may follow. B could sue Planned Parenthood over the same or a different
abortion; A could sue Planned Parenthood over a different abortion; and
A or B could sue Whole Woman’s Health, a different provider, for a different abortion. Each suit fails before a court following precedent that
SB8 is constitutionally invalid. But the provider must defend the action,
with the attendant costs and burdens.
This is not unique to SB8 or private enforcement. An executive official
could ignore binding precedent and bring a new action under a publicly
enforceable law if willing to lose in court.441 Public officials do not follow
this course, deterred by political pushback,442 the threat of attorney’s fees
awarded to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs,443 and the ethical obligations
of government attorneys.444 This represents a problem under SB8 because private plaintiffs do not operate under the political checks that deter public officials. In fact, ideological commitments to stopping abortion
437. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
440. See Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1125.
441. See id. at 1125–26.
442. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71
VAND. L. REV. 465, 498–99 (2018); Merrill, supra note 131, at 44; Neil S. Siegel, Law Is Not
Enough, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 197, 204 (2019); Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism:
An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713, 1719–20 (2017); Wasserman, supra note
98, at 1119.
443. See 41 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2019);
Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1128–29.
444. See Wasserman, supra note 98, at 1129–31.
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may incentivize A to file repeated claims. This lends insidious force to
SB8’s prohibition on attorney’s fees against losing plaintiffs or in favor of
prevailing defendants, where the claim is meritless or groundless.445 It
removes the most significant deterrent of baseless private litigation.446
E. THE PROBLEM

OF

NON-MUTUAL PRECLUSION

SB8’s elimination of the defense of non-mutual preclusion447 merits
separate commentary because the fear of this provision reflects the outrage—the hypnosis448—and error surrounding SB8 procedure.
Historically, preclusion required “mutuality,” meaning it applied in
subsequent litigation involving the parties to the first case and prevented
those parties from having to relitigate issues or claims on which they prevailed or from having the opportunity to relitigate filed issues or claims
on which they lost.449 That changed in the mid-20th century, as courts and
commentators recognized possible application of preclusion in Case 2 involving nonparties to Case 1.450 Contrary to ordinary Texas procedure,451
however, non-mutuality does not apply to SB8 actions—a provider cannot benefit from judgment in Case 1 in litigating Case 2.
Justice Sotomayor identified this as one way SB8 makes litigation
“uniquely punitive” for providers, because “if they prevail, they remain
vulnerable to suit by any other plaintiff anywhere in the State for the
same conduct.”452 Justice Sotomayor imagined the abortion equivalent of
Brainerd Currie’s train wreck—instead of a train wreck injuring fifty people and each injured person filing a separate lawsuit that forces the railroad to defend each,453 a provider performs a single abortion on which
445. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.207(i). Courts might retain power to
impose statutory sanctions for signing a frivolous pleading or motion. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 10.001–.006.
446. The delegation of exclusive enforcement authority could mean SB8 plaintiffs act
under color of state law and may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief,
damages, and attorney’s fees. Wasserman & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 1079–84, 1092–94.
“Any person” might hesitate to pursue further SB8 lawsuits, contrary to binding precedent,
if in doing so he becomes a state actor subject to damages equaling the costs the provider
incurred in defending that frivolous state-court lawsuit. Id.
447. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 171.208(e)(5).
448. Colangelo, supra note 26, at 137.
449. See Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV.
1, 10–11 (2019); Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 281 (1957); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide
Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 93 (2019).
450. See Clopton, supra note 449, at 11; Currie, supra note 449, at 282; Trammell, supra
note 449, at 94; Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Bernhard v. Bank of
Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
451. Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801–05 (Tex. 1994); Eagle
Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990); Presidio Bridge Co. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 769 S.W.2d 720, 722 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no
writ).
452. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 546 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
453. Currie, supra note 449, at 281.
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fifty “any persons” file separate seriatim lawsuits that force the provider
to defend each.
But the provider faces this burden under ordinary preclusion rules, not
unique SB8 preclusion rules. Non-mutuality never allows a party to use
the preclusive effect of a judgment against a non-party to the prior case,
who never had a day in court or the opportunity to litigate the issues.454
In Currie’s train wreck, if Passenger A loses her suit against the railroad,
the railroad never can use that favorable judgment to defeat Passenger
B’s and C’s separate suits, because Passengers B and C never had an opportunity to litigate their claims;455 the railroad must defend each claim.
Similarly, if “any person” X loses his suit to Whole Woman’s Health over
Amy’s post-heartbeat abortion, Whole Woman’s Health cannot use that
favorable judgment to defeat “any person” Y’s suit over Amy’s abortion,
because Y never had an opportunity to litigate his claim over that abortion; Whole Woman’s Health must defend each claim. This reflects ordinary preclusion rules, in which a defendant may have to defend multiple
lawsuits from multiple plaintiffs arising from the same conduct;456 it
neither departs ordinary Texas procedure nor deprives provider–defendants of procedural due process or effective post-enforcement of adjudication.457
The absence of non-mutual preclusion under SB8 may deprive a provider of a defense in two situations, although neither imposes an extraordinary burden on defending providers.
First, imagine “any person” X sues Whole Woman’s Health over Amy’s
post-heartbeat abortion, the court declares the heartbeat ban constitutionally invalid and enters judgment against X, then X sues Planned
Parenthood over Barb’s post-heartbeat abortion. Second, imagine “any
person” X sues Whole Woman’s Health over Amy’s post-heartbeat abortion, the court declares the heartbeat ban constitutionally invalid enters
judgment against X, then X sues Dr. Smith, the Whole Woman’s Health
physician who performed the abortion.
In both cases, the nonparty to the prior case uses preclusion against a
party to the prior case. Such defensive non-mutual preclusion is permissible under ordinary rules—X had an opportunity to litigate the legal issue
of the heartbeat ban’s constitutional validity and lost, so the defendant in
the second action can use that judgment to prevent X from relitigating
the issue.458 Deprived of that preclusion defense under SB8, Planned
Parenthood or Dr. Smith must litigate the constitutional issue and give X
454. Clopton, supra note 449, at 12; Currie, supra note 449, at 285–86; Trammell, supra
note 449, at 94–95.
455. Currie, supra note 449, at 285–86.
456. Justice Sotomayor’s unstated concern is the limitless future plaintiffs, who outnumber the fifty people injured in Currie’s train wreck. That objects to the scope of the cause of
the SB8 action, supra Section II.A.5, not preclusion defenses.
457. Cf. Whole Woman’s Health, 142 S. Ct. at 546–47 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
458. Clopton, supra note 449, at 12.

248

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

the opportunity to relitigate a constitutional issue on which he failed in
the first action.
But this may not impose an excessive burden. Under ordinary preclusion rules, Planned Parenthood or Dr. Smith would raise preclusion as a
basis for dismissing the second action. Under SB8’s special rules, either
moves to dismiss, reasserting the heartbeat ban’s substantive constitutional invalidity as the basis for dismissal rather than preclusion. And the
decision in X’s prior failed suit may have precedential effect (depending
on how far X pursued that case), persuading or compelling Court 2 to
agree with Court 1 that the heartbeat ban is constitutionally invalid and
to dismiss X’s new lawsuit.459
F. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY

OF

FETAL-HEARTBEAT BANS

Providers can litigate these constitutional issues and vindicate their
constitutional rights in a defensive posture. It requires an initial legal and
financial risk in having to violate the law at least once to trigger a lawsuit
and potential liability, a less secure position than pre-enforcement litigation. It may require them to litigate multiple cases against multiple plaintiffs, expanding those costs, burdens, and risks.
But this is not unprecedented. Providers stand in the same position as
the New York Times or Estelle Griswold—compelled to violate state law,
at the risk of civil or criminal liability, and to defend in state court as a
step towards Supreme Court review and vindication of their constitutional positions. Insisting that operating from this procedural posture denies judicial review460 or violates procedural due process461 denies this
history.462
Providers fear defensive litigation under SB8 for a different reason—
they will be unable to vindicate their constitutional rights. A decision protecting the speakers in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan seemed likely,
part of the Court’s broader project of vindicating individual rights in the
milieu of challenges to Jim Crow.463 Four years before Griswold, two Justices argued that Connecticut’s contraception ban was constitutionally invalid464 and a third appeared to await an appropriate application of the
statute to say the same;465 Griswold and others could risk violating the
459. Cf. Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565,
567–68 (2017).
460. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 543 (2021) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 545–46 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
461. See id. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
462. See id. at 538 (majority opinion).
463. See LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 146, at 12–13; Blasi, supra note 285, at 482;
Kalven, supra note 146, at 192; Logan, supra note 206, at 763–64; McGowan, supra note
206, at 513–14; Neuborne, supra note 204, at 79; Wasserman, supra note 146, at 836–37;
supra notes 143–51 and accompanying text.
464. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513–14 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 539
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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law, correctly believing their rights would be vindicated.
Texas providers face the opposite prospect—a Supreme Court likely to
declare SB8’s substantive provision constitutionally valid, whether by
overruling Roe and Casey or by adjusting its abortion jurisprudence to
make viability less of a constitutional dividing point.466 They fear, not
without reason, they will lose and face substantial liability in defensive
litigation.
But this reflects a substantive rather than procedural problem. Concern
that they will fail on the constitutional merits and that reproductive freedom will be lost is agnostic to the posture in which they litigate their
rights. A Supreme Court determination that SB8 is constitutionally valid
means that providers lack a substantive legal right to perform (and their
patients a constitutional right to obtain) certain abortion services, meaning they lack constitutional protection for statutory-violative conduct and
can be subject to liability and damages for that conduct. That is, if there is
no constitutional right to a six-week abortion, providers lack constitutional protection from liability. The posture or forum in which that issue
is litigated does not matter.
V. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF DEFENSIVE
LITIGATION
Reproductive-health providers, advocates, a supportive presidential
administration, and reproductive-freedom supporters do not want to litigate SB8’ constitutional validity defensively. The desire for offensive litigation, especially in federal court, is understandable, given the benefits of
that posture and the desire to litigate federal constitutional rights in a
federal forum.
But the compelled shift to defensive litigation neither thwarts nor undermines federal judicial review. Defensive litigation of federal constitutional rights provides a common and successful recourse for
constitutional review and for vindicating constitutional rights. Combined
with limited offensive avenues, these strategies solve the procedural puzzles emanating from SB8 and its inevitable imitators.

466. Wasserman, supra note 291, at 59–60.
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